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ABSTRACT
'^"nJ.SJ^i:^^ PLANNING: SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL AND THEDEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 1890-1980
SEPTEMBER 1996
BRUCE SAXON, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor David Glassberg
This dissertation traces the history of Springfield
Hospital from 1890 to 1980. I examine the case of
Springfield Hospital as a springboard to examine the larger
developments in the U.S. healthcare system in the twentieth
century. Medical historians have done yeoman work in
charting the story of hospitals to 1920 in terms of case
studies: In this work, I try to take hospital history up to
the present. Medical historians have also constructed
powerful interpretative frameworks of national hospital
development in the twentieth century. I build on their work
and in some cases take issue with their analysis based on
my examination of Springfield Hospital.
Among my findings: Spingfield's medical staff records
reveal real ambivalence among physicians about the
development of the medical center model of healthcare. The
records show as well a concurrent fight among physicians
over competing definitions of professionalism. Trustee and
Superintendent records suggest that the numbers of those
iv
unable to pay for healthcare was perhaps higher than has
been commonly believed. Furthermore, Springfield's case
indicates that private hospitals (and not just the largest
urban teaching hospitals usually surveyed in hospital
histories) did provide for large numbers of such
individuals and did not simply try to hive them off to
public facilities. Moreover, the cost and complications of
caring for the medically needy substantially shaped
Springfield's priorities and finances. This exacerbated
tensions among the medical staff over the development of
Springfield into a medical center. Most importantly, the
problems associated with caring for the indigent made
impossible effective realistic long-term planning. At
Springfield, this helped cause the decline of the medical
center model of health care and laid the basis for the
dominance of local Health Maintenance Organizations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, I explore the history of
Springfield Hospital from 1890 to 1980. In preparing to
research this history, I found it paradoxical that while
hospitals have been a central factor in the nation's
economy, culture and politics, there are virtually no
academic case studies of individual private hospitals.
Leading medical historians such as Paul Starr, Charles
Rosenberg, and Rosemary Stevens have written overviews of
apparent national developments and other historians have
assumed that their analysis is accurate and holds true for
the local level as well. A local history, then, might
provide minor variations and interesting details to what
are otherwise incontrovertible narratives. These narratives
have as their center the unfolding of such grand themes as
the rise of professionalism among physicians and the growth
of the medical center model of health care. In general,
such narratives suggest that the development of America's
current health care system was basically uncontested and
largely preordained by the prevailing medical culture.
They are largely based on extensive research into the
records of the American Medical Association, the American
Hospital Association, and other affiliated organizations,
and documents from select major hospitals in the largest
urban areas.
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There are two fundamental problems with the standard
approach to twentieth century hospital history. The
interpretation assumes that what happened in the most
advanced sector of health care simply filtered down or was
otherwise replicated down below. The second more important
problem is that these accounts assume that the rhetoric of
the various interest groups contained in their papers
accurately reflected and represented local realities and
perceptions. I find instead that standard narratives miss
crucial aspects of the development of hospitals and
misstate the role and beliefs of central participants-
particularly physicians. These histories tend to
overemphasize the coherence and unity of physicians, miss
physician's ambivalence about much of the evolution of
medicine, neglect physician's difficult experience with
government at the city and state level, and discount
physician's objections about government involvement in
health care as either paranoia, greed, or rank
disinformation.
In my study, I try to show some complexities that
traditional accounts miss and in so doing attempt to
fashion a somwehat different view of hospital history in
the twentieth century. In the first chapter, I begin with
a quick overview of the state of medicine and health care
in the 19th century. I then discuss important changes in
medicine, and in the medical profession and link these
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changes with the rise of hospitals at the beginning of the
twentieth century. Next, I focus on Springfield Hospital's
early decades to 1920. The standard literature argues that
hospitals in order to get increased revenues turned from
charitable operations to profit-making enterprises, in so
doing, they reduced services to lower class patients either
by diverting them to public hospitals or else by charging
new fees and that the result of all this was to make
private hospitals solid financially. I find to the
contrary that, at least in Springfield Hospital's case,
despite its increasing reliance on paying patients,
Springfield continued to face major financial problems
throughout this period precisely because charity care
continued to occupy a large portion of patient admissions.
Moreover, the problem of providing for charity care made it
difficult for Springfield Hospital to expand or to even
think in terms of long-term planning. I suggest that this
sort of pattern would be a recurring dynamic throughout
Springfield's history.
In my second chapter, I begin with a survey of
medicine and hospitals circa 1920. I discuss the enviable
public image and position enjoyed by physicians. I then
show how physicians were actually less exalted from 1920 to
194 0 than commonly believed or rendered in most standard
accounts. A central point here is that in important
respects, in outlook, training, and practice, the medical
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profession was hardly a tight corporate body; that few
professional organizations opposed the state of affairs,
that those who did so were unsuccessful in their efforts to
win over the rest, in the chapter, I illustrate the
truncated professionalism then current at Springfield
Hospital as shown in the areas of education, patient
records, cooperation among physicians, and community
service. I argue that financial problems of the period
caused in large part by the expense of caring for charity
patients prevented Springfield from expanding patient
services or even to offer proper patient care—further
reenforcing physician's prevailing brand of
professionalism.
In the third chapter focusing on the years from 1940
to 1960, I begin by recounting the amazing growth of
Springfield Hospital's operations—much of which was due to
the increased numbers of patients with health insurance. I
describe the advantages and limitations of health insurance
for both providers and patients. I link the growth in
patient revenues and admissions to the decision by some
Springfield physicians and administrators to make
Springfield more like its sister institutions in Boston and
New York. The remainder of the chapter addresses the
battle royale that followed, a contest hardly mentioned in
existing literature, over new definitions and new demands
4
of professionalism and the degree to which Springfield
would be restructed accordingly.
In my fourth chapter, I survey Springfield from i960
to 1975. Not till the mid 60s, I argue, did a medical
center model of health care—as opposed to a community
hospital approach—take hold at Springfield. Furthermore,
even at that point, Springfield remained rent by
dissatisfaction with the new regime, which was exacerbated
by the latter 's inability to provide an ample supply of new
services and programs of high quality to physicians. As
earlier, the cost and space devoted to caring for the
indigent derailed Springfield's development. Springfield
also faced damaging competition from its cross town
neighbor—Wesson Memorial Hospital—which enjoyed a more
balanced mix of primary care and acute care services. I
then discuss the efforts of health care planners and local
businessmen to rationalize the area's health care services.
Their efforts culminated with Springfield's merger with
Wesson in 1975. I then briefly examine the merger's impact
through 1980. In the conclusion that follows, I summarize
Springfield's history and discuss its relevence to current
hospital historiography and contemporary debates about
HMO's and health care reform.
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CHAPTER 2
SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL TO 192 0
Until the end of the l9th century, few Springfield
residents would be caught dead in a hospital. They shared
this conviction with Americans in general. The accepted
wisdom was that if you wanted to stay healthy or overcome
illness, it was best to stay away from hospitals.
Hospitals emerged after the Civil War to take care of
the sick poor. Until mid-century, those unfortunates in
Springfield and elsewhere without visible family support
who fell ill were carted off to almshouses and dumped there
together with the rest of a pathetic mass: the mad, the
blind, the crippled, the chronically arthritic. The
almshouse was generally last stop for the sick poor and
hardly anyone noticed or cared about their passing.
Profound economic and demographic changes spurred the
widespread development of hospitals. The surge of industry
helped draw millions from abroad (and many thousands of
others from American rural areas) to cities where they
labored under unhealthy and often deadly conditions for
pitiable wages. They crammed into noisome, unventilated
tenements. They subsisted on substandard diets, drank
dirty water and impure milk. They lived in the midst of
raw sewage, horse droppings, and the carcasses of spent or
slaughtered animals. They breathed soot from untreated
burning coal and inhaled the poisonous vapors pouring from
industrial plants. The number of impoverished urban folk
who fell ill, or who were injured, who were unable to
adequately care for themselves, and had no one to properly
look after them grew enormously. [i]
Almshouses were overwhelmed by the hordes of sick or
broken persons who streamed through their doors. The
plight of almshouses and those who beseeched them for
assistance caught the attention of individuals and groups
from many quarters. These included social reformers,
politicians, businessmen, labor officials, philanthropists,
and leaders of numerous ethnic and religious orders and
societies. In city after city, they set about building
hospitals to care for the needy. [2]
Support for hospitals came from various motives,
ranging from the paternalism of the wealthy and fortunate
to those in hapless circumstances, to the desire of elites
and ordinary citzens to demonstrate political leadership
and civic virtue. Rarely though were hospitals intended to
house its benefactors. These shelters for the helpless
were for "them."
Besides, given the limitations of medical care, there
was virtually nothing that could be done at most hospitals
that wasn't available at a decently appointed home. Rest,
good food, warmth, ventilation were the major tonic for
illness. Also important was attentive nursing by loving
family members who relied on potions and procedures derived
from almanacs, medical dictionaries and remedies handed
7
down from generation to generation. Mainly though, nature
was left to work its wonder, whether horrific or
beneficent. Hospitals were largely irrelevant in
determining the outcome. [3]
Home care was favored over hospital care because
hospitals were notorious for their untrained staff who gave
desultory care. in such places, oftentimes, if typhus
didn't get you (as a medical patient) than gangrene would
(as a surgical admission). Hospitals were notorious for
being dingy and dirty. They were known as pesthouses (not
only those that quarantined patients) not only because of
the contemptuous attitude of some to the "inmates" as they
were known then but because conditions were often vile with
all types of vermin crawling through the darkened corridors
and shabbby wards. For the luckless patients, it was a
terrible humiliation, for their relatives-if they had any
in the vicinity- a stain on the family that a member would
be consigned to such surroundings. [4]
Aside from the grubby setting and miserable treatment
by so-called nurses, there was another reason to favor home
care over hospital confinement; this was to avoid dealing
with the physicians who roamed the premises. Most
Americans—whatever their economic status—rightly
disdained physicians whose skills and training were usually
barely adequate or atrocious. They either completed a brief
apprenticeship before being turned loose on a not-wary-
enough public, completed a half-baked program at one of the
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numerous propietary schools, or avoided the inconvenience
of attending lectures altogether by going the
correspondence school route. [5]
Physician licensing was as unregulated at the time as
medical education. As a result, the U.S. had more
physicians per capita than any major country in Europe.
Nearly anyone could set himself up as a practitioner though
few had much scientific knowledge of the causes or
treatment of illness and disease. In fact, as James
Cassedy has remarked, "doctors if they were lucky knew just
a little more than most patients they practiced on."
Practiced indeed! [6]
Partly because the field was so overcrowded, few
physicians in the 19th century were able to make a decent
living-much less today's handsome salaries-just by
practicing medicine. Physicians resorted to barracuda-like
behavior including patient stealing to try to "make their
nut." This did not endear them to the public. Physicians
were further discredited by the open warfare then current
between the various sects of medicine, each claiming the
one and true approach to practicing medicine. Hydropaths
pushed the "water cure;" Christian Scientists swore by the
restorative power of "mental healing;" Thomsonians claimed
that roots and herbs properly used were the principal
weapon against illness; Homeopaths insisted that the
application of minute amounts of otherwise toxic
medications to ill individuals would work wonders. Of
9
course, none of the sects had anything but a vague
understanding of the bases of illnesses. [7]
To call medicine a respectable profession would have
invited derision from most Americans. Today's image of
physicians as caring professionals would be
incomprehensible to any 19th century American familiar with
physicians' harsh therapies, including bleeding, purging,
and blistering. The sick were sensible to pass these by,
to try a herbal remedy, to seek out a midwife, a mortician,
a family member or a friend for help, or simply wait and
pray that their particular affliction would pass. At least
most non-medical treatments were relatively benign. If
they did no good, they caused no further harm unlike those
of so many physicians of the day. [8]
Given the marginality of both hospitals and
physicians, it is not surprising that Springfield had been
incorporated as a city for more than 25 years before the
idea of building a general hospital for the sick was even
considered. Also, the city's attention and resources in
the seventies and eighties, as true throughout the country,
were fixed on the grave and dramatic public health problems
of the day- notably matters of proper garbage disposal and
creation of a workable sewer and water system. Even after
Springfield Hospital was incorporated in 1883, raising
money was an inordinately slow and cumbersome process. In
the first five years, not enough support was forthcoming to
even produce a plan for the proposed hospital. [9]
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Boosters, though, did not abandon their idea for a
hospital. They made appeals through the city's municipal
register for support. They also appealed to clergy who
organized "hospital Sundays" at local churches to raise
funds. A few wealthy individuals offered sizable
donations but only in return for special treatment at the
future facility. Perhaps they feared contamination from
run-of-the-mill patients or they feared neglect by the
regular staff. Whatever the case, the Board of the still
non-existent institution tactfully declined the offer,
"While the board is of the opinion that special arangements
can be made with the hospital to accommodate the proper
demands of special services at the proper time... at present
it seems inexpedient at this time to receive any but
unconditional subscriptions except as to time and manner of
payment." Though records are sketchy, there does seem to
have been a plan to build a hospital specifically for
private patients, but members determined that there was not
enough interest from prospective well-to-do patients to
justify a separate building. However, Board members did
choose to establish a special section of private rooms.
With that decision, gifts from affluent citizens increased
significantly. Most notable of these was Dorcas Chapin, a
long time resident and scion of one of Springfield's
leading families. She gave twenty-five thousand dollars to
Springfield hospital on condition that its corporators
raise a matching amount. It took them a year to do so.
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construction on the hospital finally began in 1888 and it
opened in 1889. [lO]
Popular attitudes toward the hospital were explained
in a newspaper article in 1889 shortly after its opening,
"In most minds the hospital is associated with paupers and
criminals and what are termed the unfortunate
classes.
. .Even to visit such a place is distasteful to most
people and the sick hesitate to come there." [ll]
Forty years later, a veteran physician recalled that
at the turn of the century most viewed Springfield hospital
as "an institution having little advantage over a jail
except for the matter of its being easier to depart from
and not always by the back door." The public's misgivings
and suspicions of the hospital were warranted. Springfield
hospital was a hazardous oftentimes deadly place and not
for patients alone. Through the 1890s, the casualties many
times included hospital personnel. There came to be a
stock phrase used in such bleak moments: Nurse Smith or
Physician Jones was stricken "in the midst of [his/her]
usefulness." Nurses were particularly vulnerable. Through
the decade many were forced to resign because of ill
health; this might account for the large number of those
students- about one third- who quit during their first
year. [12]
What was the patient profile that first decade? Given
that native-born Americans of means preferred home care,
the patients at Springfield hospital who filled the wards
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tended to be impoverished immigrants, more of them men than
women, more likely to be single than married, and young
rather than old. The hospital divided its patient load
depending on whether the patient was a medical or surgical
case. On the medical side, the main ailments were
infectious diseases reflecting the recurring epidemics of
malaria, tuberculosis, typhoid, and influenza in the
period. These composed the majority of patient admissions.
On the surgical side, many cases involved persons who had
been crushed or otherwise mangled generally about their
limbs including ankles, arms, feet, hands, and legs.
Industrial accidents reached epidemic proportions in late
19th century America. Springfield's prominence as a
manufacturing and transportation center ensured that these
sort of injuries accounted for a large number of patient
admissions in the 90s. [13]
Injuries received while working for one of the
railroads that criss-crossed the area were especialy
common. Railroads at the time were notoriously unsafe
workplaces. Injuries among railroad workers increased
nationally from twenty thousand in 1880 to seventy thousand
at the turn of the century. In 1900 alone, four percent of
railroad workers were hurt on the job and one of every four
hundred killed. In Springfield, not only rail workers but
also area machinists and mill hands were vulnerable to
industrial accidents. If they were lucky, the casualties
received appropriate sutures or had their fractures set.
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In more serious cases, amputations whether of fingers,
hands, arms, toes, and legs, were the rule. In the most
serious accidents, nothing could be done. There was simply
recorded the notation "death from shock of injury." When
the hospital's death rate increased in 1892, it was
attributed to a sharp rise in "hopeless injuries." in fact,
the death rate hovered at over ten percent for much of the
decade, and the medical staff eager to draw new patients
took pains to explain that the gloomy figure was no
reflection on the quality of care at the hospital. Rather,
the figure simply indicated that most of those admitted
suffered from either fatal injuries or incurable diseases.
[14]
In the 1890 's, Springfield offered little in the way
of specialized or complex medical services. Like most
other hospitals its strong suit was simply the possibility
of rest, shelter, and food for the indigent sick.
Springfield's skeletal administration offered little else
to patients. Its non-medical personnel consisted of a
superintendent, steward, and matron. They were responsible
for hiring and firing staff, obtaining supplies, keeping
the institution in proper order and cleanliness, and
overseeing the half dozen nurses and handful of other
workers. Physicians on staff typically volunteered for
one to three month stints, providing service to the
community and occasionally snagging paying patients then or
hopefully later either through gratitude or good word (for
14
data on Springfield's budget and numbers of patients and
personnel, see table in appendix). m the early nineties,
there were four physicians and four surgeons who shared the
duties yearly. [15}
Given all the limitations of health care at
Springfield hospital in those early years, it is not
surprising that public support at the outset was modest, at
best. In 1890, hospital administrators put on a brave
front, noting that the "sympathy of the public continues"
for the hospital and went on to refer to various gifts
received. But the report later explained that the matron
had been sacked. Though the hospital staff was minuscule
and received little more than room and board, the costs of
employment were deemed excessive. Not only that, there
were not enough patients to warrant her duties. It was
decided to wait until patient numbers improved before
hiring another matron and in the meantime to include her
tasks in the steward's responsibilities. [16]
Hiring decisions also reflected the ambivalence of
doctors about their involvement in the fledging enterprise.
The 1893 medical staff report explained that the hospital
would soon have to recruit a full-time physician to oversee
patient admissions and treatment. Why? While the
volunteer staff of physicians had been "faithfully
attending their onerous duties," in the near future that
would no longer be possible. The reason given was that as
patient numbers increased, physicians faced a growing
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conflict between their hospital duties and other
responsibilities. This may have been so, but other factors
were surely at work here. Granted, patient numbers were
increasing, but not much. The hospital remained relatively
small (less than seventy patients at any one time) through
the decade. And certainly, there were scores of physicians
in the city who might have been called upon to plump up the
volunteer corp. Another explanation for this request is
that most patients were primarily indigent and offered no
renumeration to the physicians. Moreover, volunteering to
treat such persons did not generally help boost a
physician's status among the affluent. It is likely for
these reasons that volunteers remained few and those that
did help out were hesitant to enlarge their hospital
responsibilities—thus the need for a full-timer. [17]
For the first decade, the hospital primarily catered
to the poor, with less than ten percent of patients paying
full freight. It was a charity operation with all the
unpleasant connotations: substandard quarters, dependency,
and often the anonymous impending demise of the
inhabitants. From the beginning the hospital faced the
problem of how to pay the expenses incurred by its
predominately indigent patient population. Initially, it
agreed to take all patients sent to it by the city. But
this quickly became an excessive burden. Within the first
year, trustee members fixed on the pattern that they would
continue for half a century. While private charity would
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continue, government funds-most ly from the city- would
supplement these. [18]
In 1890, Formal contracts were drawn up with city
officials from Springfield and surrounding towns. The
Hospital agreed to take the sick poor and in return receive
annual appropriations. This relationship continued through
the nineties. By then, the hospital was receiving more
than five thousand dollars annually for this purpose. At
the turn of the century, patients under the guardianship of
the state overseer for the poor were also routinely
receiving care at the hospital. In the teens, a new group-
-patients covered by the state workmen's compensation
board—were added to the list. The hospital was generally
willing to take those with limited or no resources and
cooperated with the state for this purpose. [19]
Pointed appeals for donations show that existing state
support was insufficient to keep Springfield Hospital
afloat. In the first decade, it was uncertain whether
Springfield could survive. In a statement typical of the
period, in the 1892 annual report, the President remarked
that while "no organized appeals have been made recently,
it will be necesssary to do so at once... and with
earnestness, if the hospital is to continue to do good and
efficient work." Were his comments then and similar
statements made through the decade by other trustees a
matter of crying wolf, of exaggerating the hospital's
difficulties simply to whip up public support? Trustee
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records indicate genuine anxiety in this period that the
Board might be forced to refuse patients, curtail programs,
and cancel building expansion because of insufficient
public backing. [20]
Springfield could not generate sufficient resources to
substantially improve its facilities. The hospital grew
only in fits and starts with no possibility of overall
planning. This was the case even in the most basic
matters. An adequate heating system and laundry, for
example, were not complete till 1893. When the hospital
opened, surgical and ward patients shared the same ward.
The President of the medical staff made repeated appeals to
the public for funds to create a separate wing for surgical
cases. As he explained, noting the hazards involved in
continuing the existing arrangement, "the mixing of
patients sick with fevers with those who are injured or who
have open wounds is obviously a great disadvantage to us."
Despite his entreaties, monies were not forthcoming and for
five more years, the two units remained joined. Also, in
the nineties, physicians pressed trustees to build a new
surgical unit. Senior staff members explained that the
existing facility was too small, ill-equipped, and
unhygenic, "in view of advancements in surgical technique
during the past few years, the time seems to have come to
provide Springfield hospital with a building adequate and
equipped as to meet requirements of asceptic surgery of
today." The Board approved the proposal in 1893 but three
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years later the project remained incomplete. In the early
years of the new century, the Board agreed to another
expansion project, this time to build an additional wing
for a new ward and to refurbish another. This project was
not finished for ten years. [21]
Funding the hospital was a constant scramble. Income
from patients never matched operating expenses. Donations
were an unreliable source of income. The bulk of
Springfield's operating funds were initially provided by
philanthropists, well-heeled city boosters, and some of the
more enlightened members of the city's business and
professional elite. New Board members were chosen in hopes
of procuring hefty donations from them while alive, and
hopefully bequests when they departed.
Income from patients, the affluent, and government
agencies was supplemented by occasional rummage sales, and
contributions of items ranging from flowers to furniture to
food. Fundraising benefits were also critical in
sustaining Springfield during its first decade of
existence. Lavishly appointed charity balls brought
together business leaders, debutantes, society swells, and
politicians from near and far. They flocked to hear
entertainment provided by the likes of John Phillip Sousa
or the Philadelphia Philharmonic. [22]
Hospital leaders tried various devices to raise
additional funds. Trustee members and senior medical staff
formed a fundraising committee, streamlined hospital
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operations, hired a collector to dun deadbeats, decided to
charge non-Springfield residents higher rates, debated
whether to close the nursing school in 1897, and even
refused admission to some patients after the city
temporarily dropped its subsidy due to budget problems in
1899. However, none of these measures proved effectual in
cobbling together a reliable financial base for the
institution. The revenue derived from the few paying
patients was not enough to offset the costs of care
rendered to the rest at reduced prices or gratis. [23]
A New Century
In 1899, on the tenth anniversary of the hospital's
opening, the president recounted that in the early years
the hospital "was a feeble institution. .. struggling for its
existence. .. in a period when the purpose and value of the
hospital was not fully understood or appreciated."
However, he was confident that Springfield Hospital was
rapidly becoming an accepted and vital part of the
community. His comments were not the crowing and wishful
thinking of a hospital supporter. A number of factors at
the turn of the century and later caused the public in
Springfield and much of the country to rally around
physicians and hospitals [24].
The American Medical Association's role was key in
increasing the competence and authority and public regard
for physicians. Founded in 1846, by 1900 the AMA finally
gathered the membership, the resources, and the will to
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become the nation's principal gatekeeper of medicine. The
AMA worked to clean its own house in the early twentieth
century by helping tighten physician licensing laws,
increasing regulations over legitimate medical schools,
forcing out the fly-by-night facilities, and fashioning
rules for the upkeep and inspection of hospitals, it
supported laws against unethical conduct by physicians,
including physician advertising. Moreover, it supported
school health inspections and the passage of the Food and
Drug Act. [25]
The AMA's Council On Medical Education worked with the
Association Of American Medical Colleges and later the
Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations to institute a
rigorous standardized curriculum for medical schools. This
was sorely needed at a time when less than ten percent of
physicians graduated from recognized medical schools and
twenty percent had never attended medical school lectures.
They introduced a research component and internships into
medical school programs, and generally helped ensure that
students graduated with genuine technical and diagnostic
skills. [26] Until then, the rule of thumb for most
medical schools was that if you had the cash, they had a
spot for you. No longer. Now, rigorous exams determined
acceptance or rejection, and acceptance into school no
longer guaranteed graduation. Students now had to pay
close attention to their courses. Final exams became much
more demanding. No longer could students at Harvard and
21
elsewhere pass their finals by simply responding to a few
questions in a brief oral exam. [27]
Earlier graduates were mostly jack-of-all-trades and
masters of none. This rapidly changed. Increased
attention to basic science and research in medical schools
led to advances in physiology, anatomy, pathology, and
bacteriology. This was a crucial factor in the development
of the specialties. Surgery was the outstanding example
but they also included pediatrics, obstetrics, opthomology,
orthopedics, and urology. [28]
Physicians, whatever their specialty, also enjoyed new
accuracy in diagnosis and treatment thanks to new chemical
procedures to test blood, stool, and tissue samples.
Moreover, advances in pathology enabled physicians to chart
more closely the genesis and progression of disease. [29]
The benefits of scientific medicine extended to public
health. Regulation of the milk and water supply reduced
mortality rates. These years also saw a test for
syphillis, a diptheria anti-toxin, and vaccines for tetnus
and typhoid. All of these, very visibly, helped save
lives. They also helped raise physicians' standing and
that of the medical establishment in general. [30]
One of the major factors at Springfield Hospital that
helped boost public support for both physicians and
hospitals were improved surgical techniques. In 1901, the
Board's president explained, in years past, "many useless
and harmful operations have been done" but now "good
22
results are becoming more and more the rule. Operations
rare and almost unthought of ten years ago are common now."
[31]
Major surgery in the hospital had been limited to only
the most dire of circumstances. Even in most cases of head
or abdominal injuries, physicians usually let nature take
its course rather than open body cavities except when
"outside forces like a horse or buggy or street car had
already started the job." [32]
Until the turn of the century, surgery was restricted
in part because of the pain it caused (and the death from
shock that often followed) . When surgery was unavoidable,
doctors used hypnosis and alchohol or opium to try to
distract the patient, but this was not always successful.
It was difficult to get the job done when the poor fellow
was screeching and struggling. Some surgeons also believed
that pain was part of the healing process, that it was best
to leave out painkillers altogether; patients were
admonished to simply ignore or put up with the torture.
Few were able to do so. For these reasons, both physicians
and patients had long limited surgical procedures to minor
fractures, superficial wounds, and ulcers. But the
development and rapid refinement of anesthesia made more
complex operations possible and tolerable. [33]
Another factor behind Springfield's Hospital's
increasing number of surgical procedures was that
physicians there as elsewhere were learning how to prevent
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post-operative infection. Post-operative surgery death
rates hovered around twenty-five percent till the turn of
the century. And dealth rates were significantly higher in
hospitals than in private residences because conditions
were not sanitary in most hospitals. This began to change
by the turn of the century. Physicians and nursing staff
at Springfield Hospital and nationally learned how to
practice sterile procedures from textbooks, post-graduate
training, and on the job instruction. As John Duffy and
others have written, medical personnel learned the
importance of washing their hands before touching patients
and of wearing rubber gloves while conducting operations.
They learned to properly clean instruments instead of just
smearing blood and other less vital fluids on their gowns
before going back in for another try and to sanitize
instruments that fell on the floor instead of simply
continuing to use them. Physicians stopped the practice of
moistening suture threads with saliva. Nurses learned to
dress bandages to keep them clean instead of using dirty
ones over and over again. [34]
With these changes surgery became more successful and
safer. More patients were now willing to go under the
knife, and physicians were more confident that patients
would survive operations and recover. Surgery, especially
of the abdominal and pelvic region, became a routine
procedure. Appendectomies (practically unknown in 1890)
and gynecological operations became commonplace. Formerly,
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those with peritonitus (inflammation or infection of the
abdominal cavity) were "condemned to death" because
physicians were unable to operate on them; now such
operations could go forward and patients more often than
not would recover. As a result, the annual number of
abdominal operations doubled at century's end from twenty-
eight to sixty while the death rate which had been
seventeen percent when Springfield Hospital first opened
fell to just eight percent. [35]
As was true of hospitals elsewhere, in these years
public perception of Springfield Hospital began to shift
from a place evoking dread and fear to one inspiring hope
and confidence. As one newspaper editorial explained in
1908 "The wonderful cures wrought by the skill of the
surgeon and the trained nurse are the miracles of the 20th
century Many people think of the hospital as the place
where pain is caused. I wish it were possible to estimate
the amount of pain that is cured Springfield is a
veritable temple of healing." [36]
By 1900, patients were much more willing to enter
Springfield Hospital and put themselves under the care of
its physicians. Individuals were no longer stigmatized for
entering a hospital. Family members could now rest easy
knowing that their kin were getting professional care
there. As a result of improved and expanded treatment,
more affluent patients gained genuine confidence in
hospital care. The way was now clear to admit more paying
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patients, an appparent solution to the hospital's chronic
financial travails.
Springfield Hospital like many other institutions
turned to private patients and patient fees to keep itself
afloat. Patient fees, by World War One, would account for
more than half of hospital revenues. Already, by the end
of the century, there were a few private rooms for well-to-
do patients. A few years later, semi-private rooms were
built with sliding scale fees that the middle class could
afford and thereby get treatment while avoiding association
with persons in general wards. Board members tried to
encourage area physicians to treat more private patients in
the hospital and formed a joint committee with physicians
for advice on how to make the hospital a more welcome place
for private patients. Records were also kept of the total
number of patients admitted by each physician per month,
detailing the proportion of paying versus charity patients
with an eye to motivate physicians to try to improve the
ratio. [37]
By all accounts, the decision to aggressively court
private patients paid off handsomely at the outset.
Springfield Hospital doubled its income from 1902 to 1904
from nineteen thousand to thirty-five thousand dollars.
With the infusion of these monies, the hospital increased
its number of beds from sixty to one hundred and purchased
much needed equipment. Perhaps most impressive was the
increase in patient admissions. As the President noted in
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1909 "the custom of using our hospital has materially
increased in the past five years, m 1902 these jumped
fifteen percent over the previous year, the largest
increase in its history." During the following year, 1903,
patient admissions increased forty percent to 773. From
1901 to 1908 patient admissions tripled from 465 to 1,337.
Income from patients now represented about two-thirds of
total revenues, twice the proportion of the 1890s.
Testifying to both physicians' willingness to do invasive
surgery and patients' increasing acceptance of the
procedure, about two-thirds of patient admissions were now
surgical cases, also twice as many as in the early days of
the facility. By 1912, there were three times as many
patients admitted for surgical cases as for medical ones,
outstripping even national trends. The gender mix changed
as well. In the 90 's, patients admitted were predominately
male. But by the teens, women were the majority. In the
occupation list of patients, the largest category was now
housewives, who were coming in increasing numbers for
childbirth. Their growing trust in hospital care is
reflected also in the rising numbers of operations of
tonsilectomies on their children. [38]
To get more paying patients, Springfield
administrators made special arrangements to make certain
hospital beds private. Like other hospitals nationally,
Springfield contracted with numerous professional and
business organizations in the years before World War One to
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pay to have their members specially provided for in the
hospital. A 'free' bed was set aside for members of a
local Church in return for a large contribution from one of
the parishoners. A manufacturing concern gave several
hundred dollars a year to set aside bed service for its
employees. A prominent citizen from Chicopee gave five
thousand dollars for a free bed for town residents in need
of treatment. New England Telephone bought a bed for five
years to cover the care of its employees. [39]
Reorienting the patient pool towards paying patients
seemingly represented a fundamental shift at Springfield
Hospital. Some hospital leaders, while supporting the
decision, also expressed a certain ambivalence about the
new policy. They feared that care would become two class,
the poor would be neglected, and some might be shut out
altogether. [40]
It cannot be denied that charity work henceforth
occupied a decidely less central place in the
considerations of hospital personnel and in the day-to-day
operations of the institution. The decision to reorient
the institution to the care of private patients was
certainly hard-nosed. But was it hardhearted?
It is true that the patient mix changed. Private
patients quickly dominated the admission pool, surging from
less than ten percent in the 1890s to more than two thirds
ten years later. It is also true that increasing numbers
of private and semi-private patients elbowed aside poorer
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patients to some extent. The records indicate extreme
crowding in the wards during the following decade,
including at one point three times the desired number in
the children's wards. Some of the poor may have been
refused admittance altogether. It is also true that
accommodations in the general wards were not upgraded as
needed because many of the available discretionary funds
were sunk in facilities for more solvent patients. One
glaring example: In 1910 there were still not separate
sections for surgical and medical cases in the open wards.
[41]
On the other hand, the increased revenues from private
patients made possible a general expansion of the facility
allowing for more charity patients. The equation was
simple: without private patients, the increased numbers of
public patients could not have been covered. Granted,
private patients enjoyed creature comforts and personal
care not available for ward patients. But, overall, care
was far better for both private and public patients than
ever before, and many more poor treated. The move to
private patients was not the act of a souless corporation
but an appropriate shift given the paucity of public
funding for the facility.
To relieve crowding at the hospital, and the crowding
of more affluent patients by working class persons, in
1911 hospital officials explored the possibility of
organizing a dispensary. In 1913, Hospital officials voted
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to help fund a district nurse who arranged for patients to
convalesce at home and to visit them there as needed. By
1914, these visits totalled more then two thousand yearly.
[42]
Still the poor came to the hospital and were not
turned away. To its credit, Springfield Hospital took them
in, if it did not actively encourage them. In these years,
it was not unusual for less than twenty-five percent of
patients to pay the full cost of care and forty percent to
pay half or less. The hospital tried to establish more
semi-private rooms but there were not enough of these to
offset losses elsewhere; in any case, even the patient fees
frequently did not completely cover the costs of care.
Regular contributions were not enough to make up the
difference; neither were state subsidies. [43]
For a few years following the turn towards private
patients, the crush of patients and infusion of cash was
enough to comfortably fund the hospital. However, the
windfall from the new crop of patients lasted less than a
decade. Springfield soon found itself in somewhat
straitened circumstances. It turned once again to public
authorities for help. Squabbles arose between the hospital
and local and state officials over appropriate renumeration
and reasonable length of stay for charity patients. And
periodically, in times of mounting debts, trustees sold off
real estate holdings, stocks, and other assets to generate
capital. [44]
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In 1914, the Hospital managed to raise sufficient
funds to erect a new wing with more patient rooms. The
addition had been part of a more comprehensive plan for
seven new buildings first unveiled in 1910. The rest of
the plan was never implemented. Instead, for several years
following, Hospital officials frantically tried to somehow
increase the number of regular subscribers (contributors)
to the hospital to simply get through each year and to
defray the mounting debt which by 1917 topped one hundred
fifty thousand dollars. [45]
Conclusion
The problems hospital administrators, physicians, and
trustees faced from 1890 to 1920 would remain the pattern
throughout Springfield's history. Improvements in
technology and services resulted in increased numbers of
patients treated but also additional costs of expansion,
materials, physical plant, supplies, equipment, and
personnel. Moreover, covering the cost of treatment of the
poor would remain a special problem. Unlike some hospitals
in other cities, Springfield did not have a public hospital
to siphon off the indigent sick. There was no public
versus private hospital split in Springfield largely
because there was no significant public hospital to speak
of. Was Springfield the exception or the rule here? If
Springfield's experience was more representative of typical
communities in the country, than the financial well being
of the nation's hospitals was considerably weaker than
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historians have generally indicated. The burden of the
cost of treatment of the poor was a central factor for such
hospitals. Increased numbers of private patients never
translated into sufficient patient fees to match the
increased costs. Sooner or later hospital operations
deteriorated marked by overcrowding and an inability to
afford needed renovations. By the 1920s—the moment of the
city's greatest prosperity—exactly this sort of scenario
would unfold. [46]
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CHAPTER 3
SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL 1920-1940
Something momentous happened in American health care
by about 1920. Thanks to continued improvements in
standards of training, diagnosis, and treatment, an ailing
person who consulted a doctor stood better than a fifty-
fifty chance of benefiting from the encounter. Many
Americans who less than a generation earlier would have
disparaged doctors as quacks now glorified them as saviors.
Thanks to the joint efforts of public health workers and
doctors, the country had nearly wiped out infectious
diseases. Compared to decades past, when so many—children
and adults—succumbed to an early and sudden death,
Americans felt almost invulnerable. Moreover, with several
diseases now regarded as potentially curable, ailments like
colds or sore throats that patients previously had ignored
now became a concern of patients and doctors alike. [1]
In novels and films, the press and pulpit, doctors
were praised as selfless and devoted healers, who stamped
out disease and invented remedies for diabetes, vitamin
deficiencies, and hormone abnormalities. The grateful
nation rewarded them with high incomes and unprecedented
influence-notably among civic groups, legislators, and
businessmen. [2]
Hospitals, of course, benefited from improvements in
health care, from doctors' lofty status, from Americans'
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heightened attention to their physical well being. For one
thing, hospitals no longer had to advertise for customers.
In fact, following cure or recuperation, patients
occasionally lingered in hospital premises which were said
to combine the conveniences of well-appointed homes with
the amenities of luxury hotels. Also, the nation's
foundations showered hospitals and affiliated medical
schools with 150 million dollars for the latest and
greatest research projects, in stark contrast to the time
when they had given just thousands and that grudgingly;
medicine became the best funded of philanthropic causes. [3]
At the pinnacle of the hospital establishment were
doctors, deans, and administrators at major medical schools
and the largest teaching hospitals in Cambridge, Baltimore,
New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere. Brimming with
fungible capital, scientific knowledge, highly skilled
personnel, and up-to-date technology, the achievements,
rules, and methods, of these institutions were expected to
spread to hospitals everywhere. Hospital superintendents,
medical staff, local medical societies, national
professional organizations, and governmental agencies would
all eagerly implement the healthcare visionaries' plans.
Ultimately, medical leaders predicted, healthcare would be
socialized like major utilities, and the public's health
managed by government as thoroughly as public safety. [4]
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Certain that America would adopt social welfare
policies similar to those found in the advanced countries
of Europe, Many medical leaders regarded the development of
a coordinated universal health care system as both
inevitable and imminent. It was neither. Such a system
could only develop if physicians joined together en masse,
embraced the idea, and assumed a leading role in its
creation. That did not happen. Despite the hosannas given
physicians and medicine being the queen of the professions,
their regal position was not altogether deserved and was
not universally accepted. Physicians could not be
innovators when their medical education promoted an insular
view of medical practice, so long as physicians adhered to
narrow parochial interests, and important health services
remained sparsely distributed. [ 5]
Physicians were thought to possess exemplary and
demonstrable expertise. Yet, improvements in educational
program standards the previous twenty years had, in some
respects, been surprisingly modest. Most medical students
had a high school education plus some college courses.
They did not need more in the way of background, because
most medical school courses included very little basic
science or clinical work, and required little analysis of
medical or scientific problems. Furthermore, students used
textbooks that (unbeknownst to them) recommended treatments
that were often ineffective or even harmful. Finally,
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after completing their coursework, students served hospital
clerkships that oftentimes lacked supervision or any
genuine training. [6]
Following graduation, about one quarter of the newly
minted M.D.s took licensing exams. Few states required
such exams (Massachusetts was a notable exception)
.
However, those who chose to take and pass exams hoped to
reassure prospective patients of their competence; perhaps
it was best for all concerned that patients were unaware
that the exams usually were multiple choice and tested
knowledge of lists and definitions recapitulated from
medical school courses. [7]
A small minority of medical school graduates went on
to internships and residencies. These post-graduate
programs were not much better then medical school
clerkships: few hospitals even had formal relationships
with medical schools, much less well organized programs.
Interns and residents invariably filled the lowest priority
staffing needs in hospitals; attending physicians cared
little about providing advanced education and training to
recent graduates. It was more convenient to assign the
drudge work to the newcomers.
The popular image of physicians as specialists who
combined research with patient care was based on the
acomplishments of those practicing at elite urban teaching
hospitals. However, most physicians in this period, as
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before, were full-time general practitioners who worked in
small general hospitals. Full-time board certified
specialists comprised less than one-third of all physicians
even by 1940. others called themselves "specialists" but
they often had no substantive training, or they were
"partial specialists," moonlighting general practitioners,
who had skipped their residencies and who had not taken or
passed the specialty exams. It was easy for them to begin
lucrative and prestigious practices (specialists often made
three times the income of general practitioners)
.[ 8
]
Acceptable standards for medical education and
practice remained lax because the profession was not nearly
as united as its leaders claimed, or as the public was led
to believe. Americans believed that specialists were the
apex of the profession; specialists regarded themselves as
the most influential of doctors. Both specialists and
laymen were mistaken. Specialists were a small minority of
the profession, and their opinions were outweighed by those
of general practitioners in all but the largest cities
—
partly because specialists themselves were a highly
disparate lot.
The profession's cardinal principle was that each
physician should freely determine the scope of his own
practice. That freedom intensified the perpetual search
for patients, and diverted physicians from considering more
expansive notions of health care. Without agreed upon
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was more
standards among practitioners, fierce competition
common than comity or cooperation. Specialists vied with
generalists; sub-specialties-more than a dozen of them-
squared off against one another; rivalries were
particularly intense between pediatricians and
obstetricians and gynecologists, between psychiatrists and
neurolgists, and between surgeons and internists. Each of
the subspecialties had separate certifying boards which
were really professional clubs whose major priority was to
stake out turf and prestige— insuring that specialists were
expert practitioners was not always their highest priority.
Instead of policing themselves, they condoned incompetent
physicians; building social networks was their primary
goal. Virtually anyone claiming to be a specialist could
get a specialty board to vouch for them. [9]
Instead of working in tandem, medical factions debated
one another in medical societies, in schools, and in
hospitals. With no agreed upon overarching national
standards, standards were established arbitrarily by
whomever held the most power at any given moment in a
hospital, medical school, or medical society. [10]
Hospitals formed their own national accrediting
organization, but its standards were only attained by large
urban hospitals dominated by specialists and which employed
a paid staff that generally had close ties to area medical
schools. Aside from this tiny minority, most physicians
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and administrators routinely flouted accreditation
recommendations. Where hospital inspections occurred and
guidelines for improvement provided, they were not likely
to be implemented. When penalties were assessed, they were
too mild to have an impact on hospital affairs. When
accrediting agencies condemned inept or indifferent
physicians, administrators fiddled and diddled because they
needed the physician's business. Furthermore, physicians
often had admitting privileges at several hospitals.
Hospitals that physicians judged as unfairly restrictive
quickly lost business to their neighbors down the street.
Hospitals' survival depended on pleasing physicians with
dubious medical expertise and questionable ideas of
professional service —regarding who was fit to perform
operations, who was qualified for appointments to the
staff, how to maintain case records and conduct
postmortems, and so on. [11]
Physicians' business practices and intramural
catfights were not usually privy to laymen. One reason was
that John Doe rarely saw a physician. Most Americans
continued to rely on a priest, family member, or friend for
medical advice. For medications, Americans turned to
itinerant salesmen or local grocers and probably spent more
for patent medicines than for physician consultations
.[ 12
]
One reason why the sick rarely consulted phsycians was
that few could easily afford health care. Most Americans
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had a difficult time paying their medical bills. This is
Why the majority of Americans saw a physician less than
once a year. For the working classes, disaster was apt to
strike those who fell ill and went without medical care;
sickness was the leading cause of destitution. in the
largest cities, where free care was most readily available,
one quarter of the population relied on clinics and other
outpatient services
.[ 13
]
Aside from cost, another reason patients rarely saw
doctors was that the latter 's actions belied their popular
image. in diagnosis they were prone to say the obvious and
not provide much in the way of solutions. The miracles
promised by x-ray machines and tb tests did not come to
pass; in many instances these and other instruments
produced faulty or ambiguous information, or produced
accurate findings that were then misinterpreted by doctors.
Furthermore, doctors could do little to treat cancer,
tuberculosis, mental illness, or chronic ailments (the
latter, then as now, was the fastest growing patient pool);
doctors avoided these fields, and focused their attention
on those areas—like surgery—that offered more favorable
outcomes for both doctor and patient. [14]
Doctors may have appeared to be prosperous but not
every doctor had a lucrative practice. While city
physicians in the 1920s usually made from $8,000 to $12,000
yearly, overall, average yearly earnings were less than
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half that aniount. Specialists made much more than
generalists. And whatever their locale or field, few
doctors did well financially in their early years of
practice.
Doctors opposed anything that might undermine their
independence or threaten their economic stake. Most were
adamant that the government should keep its mitts out of
medical practice and therefore fought state aid to veterans
and the chronically ill, to child welfare and venereal
disease clinics, or to cancer research. Doctors who
deviated from the party line were ostracized by their
colleagues, were drummed out of local and state medical
societies, denied referrals from other doctors and
admitting privileges at many hospitals
.[ 15
]
One reason why doctors so vehemently opposed state
involvement in health care was that many doctors—
especially general practitioners—felt more embattled than
exalted in the twenties. Ironically, while the public
image of physicians had improved, the actual practice of
medicine had in certain ways become more difficult. All
the hullabaloo about the glories of scientific medicine
seemed to undermine those practicing the art of medicine.
Researchers and specialists got the lion's share of public
attention and adulation. General practitioners were
treated as the dinosaurs of the profession, doomed for
extinction once the medical and social planners had their
way, even though general practitioners comprised the
inajority of physicians and saw the vast inajority of
patients. Many of them felt squeezed by outside
institutions, including representatives of accreditation
agencies, medical schools, foundations, government
agencies, and at times by some of their own
organizations. [16]
Medical Care And HPalth Care Tn The Citv Of
.gp .-.- n^^^ .1 ^
In the twenties, large numbers of city residents and
individuals from surrounding towns streamed to Springfield
Hospital—many for the first time in their lives. More
people of all classes made use of Springfield's facilities
In fact, its growth rate was double that of the city's
population. Operations alone jumped more than 100%; non-
surgical admissions rose even faster, and lab exams and x-
rays, which previously were so infrequent that they were
left unrecorded, now totalled many hundreds yearly. [17]
Already by the early twenties, Springfield Hospital
reached its maximum capacity. Patient care soon
deteriorated in severely overcrowded wards. To absorb the
overflow, patients were shipped off to three make-shift
units in adjacent houses. Occasionally, it proved too
difficult to provide even basic amenities, and patients
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were turned away;
.any others faced long delays in
treatment. [18]
Through the twenties, the refrain came from the
superintendent and medical staff: All facilities are being
utilized to the utmost, renovation and expansion of the
institution must begin as soon as possible. This was not
hyperbole. Constant crowding, overwork, and use of
antiquated equipment strained Springfield's staff.
Springfield needed larger facilities to meet the crush of
new patients but was hardpressed just to meet its ongoing
expenses. Finding the funds quickly to construct a new
building was impossible-the building was not completed for
a decade. [19]
Difficulty in collecting patient fees was
Springfield's major financial problem. Prevailing economic
industrial conditions largely determined patient income.
Free work and late payments were inevitable and unavoidable
aspects of doing business. Springfield was severely
handicapped by these circumstances; it could never budget
for major expenses, or plan for the future. [20]
The matter of erratic payment illustrates another fact
about patients in the twenties; a majority of them were
from working-class or lower middle-class backgrounds. Many
were the first in their families to seek out and receive
hospital care and came to Springfield in much larger
numbers than ever before. In the mid-twenties, free in-
patient care comprised between ten and twenty percent of
the total number of patients treated, and another ten to
twenty percent were city or state subsidized. [21]
Where the care and comfort of paying patients was
concerned, Springfield's Superintendent, John Gardiner, was
especially attentive. He issued memos to physicians
reminding them to make sure that foreign objects not be
left behind in patients after operations or examinations.
Concerning indigent patients he was less solicitous,
expressing alarm, for example, at the increasing numbers of
free beds and the burdensome expenditures stretching into
the thousands of dollars to pay for them. His alarm was
understandable, since such expenditures amounted to a
significant portion of the hospital's yearly deficit—
sometimes reaching one-half of the total. [22]
Established in 1925, the outpatient department was the
main provider of care for the working and lower middle
classes. Within a few years of its 1925 opening, the
department handled a caseload of more than ten thousand
patients a year. To help the department run smoothly, a
social worker-Mrs. Jeanne Dixon-was hired. She had two
major responsibilities; her first was to provide non-
medical services to patients that would help in their
treatment and recovery. She purchased braces, located
nursing homes for the growing numbers of chronically ill
elderly, comforted patients whose attending physicians
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Changed every month or so, and referred patients and family
members to various agencies, as appropriate. Mrs. Dixon's
other responsibility was to be the gatekeeper for the
hospital in terms of patient admissions and payments. To
do this she investigated each potential patient's
employment and financial status.
Mrs. Dixon had to serve the patient's needs and also
serve the hospital's interests in terms of controlling
operating costs and crowding, it was an awkward position.
Hospital administrators and doctors insisted that she get
patients in and out as rapidly as possible, and, above all,
that she bar solvent patients from free services. Trying
to mesh two very different goals in the service of two very
different constituencies was a source of ongoing tension
between Mrs. Dixon and hospital officials; and the tension
was illustrated in her monthly reports. [23]
Mrs. Dixon's reports offer the first detailed glimpse
of patients at Springfield Hospital. They reveal something
of the entry of large numbers of working-class patients
into the hospital. The reports also indicate something
else: Mrs. Dixon was intent on persuading administrators,
physicians, and trustees that indigent working-class
patients deserved healthcare—even for non-emergencies. [24
]
Mrs. Dixon reported that her clients, due to poverty,
had rarely if ever received medical treatment. Now, for
the first time they were getting help. One early case
involved a fe.ale factory worker who had had a draining
abscess of tubercular origin for several years which had
deformed her leg and made it excruciating for her to stand
while at work. Another case concerned a girl of fifteen
Who was brought in complaining of breathing problems and a
goiter. She had been kept at home since infancy because
her parents believed her to be an invalid. The physician
discovered no serious medical problems, and concluded that
the girl be sent to school and get regular exercise. [25]
One case may have been the most telling of all. a
sick young girl was brought to the hospital. Several weeks
later, after her condition had apparently improved, one of
the nurses noticed that no one had visited her. The social
worker investigated and discovered that the parents had
abandoned their daughter and left town. It was a callous
act, to be sure. And it was certainly shocking. However,
it is quite possible that the parents felt unable to care
for her themselves, that by abandoning her, private
agencies would come forward to do a better job, that her
access to healthcare would be greater as an orphan than as
a member of a destitute family. [26]
Dixon's stories were designed to reassure Springfield
staff skeptical of the worth of the outpatient department
and dismissive of Dixon's contributions. Some felt, with
good reason, that the department was a financial drain,
that Springfield could ill afford. Hospital administrators
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and medical staff could never be certain that the social
worker-or the outpatient department itself-actually
reduced inpatient care for the indigent.
Mrs. Dixon also was suspected of aiding the
undeserving by providing care gratis for persons who could
easily afford to pay. she periodically tried to reassure
physicians, administrators, and trustees on this point,
explaining that all prospective patients were thoroughly
vetted in full view of the rest to determine whether they
merited special financial consideration based on the
"patients social and financial status and previous medical
treatment." She determined that fewer than five percent of
outpatients were actually able to pay for private medical
care, that very few patients ever tried to abuse the
service—and none succeeded. In the summer of 1927, she
reported the case of one such freeloader; a middle-aged
single man, a laborer, who was treated at the clinic for an
undisclosed ailment. Having no savings, he asked that he
be given free care. The social worker sternly chastised
him for his desultory spending habits. He assured her he
had learned his lesson. From then on, he vowed, he would
set aside part of his meager wages in case something
similar ever happened again. [27]
Through her reports, Mrs. Dixon tried to demonstrate
the usefulness of her work and the genuinely worthy state
of her charges. She was not terribly successful in her
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campaign. Springfield's outpatient department, like
clinics elsewhere, clearly ranked low among hospital
priorities as evidenced by its abysmal funding and general
neglect by physicians and administrators, on the other
hand, however much Springfield officials may have recoiled
at the expansion of outpatient services, they did not
exclude indigent and lower class patients from medical
care. Charity at Springfield in the twenties was more
extensive and more costly for the hospital than ever
before. [28]
Volunteers helped Mrs. Dixon sustain outpatient
services. But there were never enough volunteers and so
clinics were severely crowded and understaffed; when
volunteers' committment flagged, the already woefully
limited programs ceased. Occasionally, volunteers
suggested that programs be expanded or new ones be
established. However, their proposals were rarely taken
seriously or ever implemented by Springfield's
hierarchy. [29]
Hospital volunteers were part of a loose network of
individuals—many of them middle and upper-class women
—
involved in numerous social welfare projects in groups like
the Family Welfare Association, the Visiting Nurses
Association, the Junior League, the Women's Club, and the
Community Chest. At a time when government was generally
uninvolved in such matters, when the vast majority of
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residents had no health care provisions in jobs, when the
majority of children six years or younger had never had a
physical exam, they alerted Springfield officials and
ordinary citizens about pressing health care needs and
encouraged increased public and private support for health
services. [30]
The Visiting Nurse Association, typical of other
charitable organizations, provided care for mothers and
children, the elderly and incapicitated. The VNA cared for
thousands of residents, and of those only a minority were
immigrants or the impoverished; only one-third received
totally free care; only one-third were born outside the
U.S. [31]
Due to anemic support from both the city and from
private donations, the VNA's budget was always bare-boned.
With an inadequate budget, it could never hire enough
nurses and could only pay them a pittance. Due to the low
salaries and enormous work loads, the VNA could only
recruit inexperienced and sometimes incompetent student
nurses, or marginal graduate nurses who tended to be
disloyal and irresponsible. [32]
In addition to already trying circumstances faced by
the VNA, the organization faced charges of patient poaching
from physicians. Physicians worked with VNA nurses but
only reluctantly and insisted on two conditions for their
cooperation: visiting nurses could see patients only
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following a medical referral. Yet, most of these patients
couldn't afford physician fees; just one quarter of
patients contacted a physician prior to seeing the VNA
nurse. Physicians also insisted that VNA nurses restrict
themselves to educational work. in practice, of course,
since patients were unlikely to get medical help otherwise,
this demand was also ignored by nurses and patients.
Finally, Visiting Nurses were supposed to be working
primarily on a charitable basis. The problem was that if
nurses treated too many for free, physicians attacked them
for harboring chiselers; if they charged too many too much,
they were attacked as competitors. The VNA, like other
non-hospital based health care providers, skirmished with
physicians over competing responsibilities. The VNA was
victorious to the extent that it provided care for twenty
percent of Springfield's residents. Yet, their work never
received commensurate city or private support. [33]
Through the twenties, overwhelmed by public demand for
their services, the VNA and similar groups regularly
implored city officials to assume greater responsibilities
for the costs of clinics and for the visiting nursing care.
They wanted adequate health care to be a true community
responsibility, and not contingent on the good deeds of
volunteers, philanthropists, and overworked staff.
However, the prevailing view among the city's elite was
that private charity was intrinsically more responsive than
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government, was a more profound demonstration of duty to
one's neighbors, that increased government aid would
actually harm health care services by making them
bureaucratic and unprofessional
.[ 34
]
Despite the lack of adequate public support for
community healthcare, graduate nurses in the VNA valiantly
tried to meet working class healthcare needs. At
Springfield Hospital, student nurses worked as the major
patient care providers—especially to charity patients.
Nursing was the best many young women could hope for, aside
from being a clerk, a salesgirl, or a secretary, at a time
when women were mostly excluded from the professions. [35]
Nursing 'professionalism' was different than that of
male-dominated fields like medicine and law; nurses were
expected to be utterly subservient to physicians, to master
rituals of deference such as standing when physicians
entered a room or giving up their seats to physicians.
They learned to be attentive to physicians' every motion,
mood, or instruction, to refrain from ever making important
decisions about patient care, to labor without reward or
relief and with little hope of education or occupational
advancement. The professionalization of nursing was
thereby delayed for decades; instead Springfield nurses
simply aped existing women's roles in which nurses
recapitulated behaviors of wives, daughters, and
servants. [36]
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Springfield relied on student nurses to accommodate
the growing number of patients while saving money and
evading laws restricting the hours of licensed nurses.
However, the supply of competent student nurses never kept
up with the demand. Springfield Hospital couldn't recruit
or retain an adequate nursing corps because nurses suffered
gross exploition. [37]
Little had changed since 1893 when Springfield
Hospital Nurse Training School first opened. From the
beginning, 'instructors' emphasized practical training on
the wards with little time devoted to lectures or lab
instruction. Nurses were expected to be mulish and
obliging to all demands. Such behavior was viewed as
emblematic of womanly values of the time and notions of
"separate spheres." Ideal candidates had had extensive
experience either as mothers helpers or as servants
.[ 38
]
Nurses were expected to sacrifice their own health, if
need be, to the needs of patients. That they agreed to do
so was evident by their presence in large numbers as
patients (unlike physicians)—at times comprising half of
general ward patients and a major hospital expense. Ill
health forced many nurses to take lengthy leaves of
absence; the dropout rate sometimes totalled thirty
percent; dismayed by so many of their classmates falling
ill and forced to leave school, student nurses could only
wait and wonder how long they would remain healthy. [39]
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Even if nursing had not been an exhausting, thankless
and dangerous job, it would have been difficult for
administrators to recruit student nurses. Recruitment was
doubly difficult because the job offered little in the way
Of professional rewards. Pay, for example was generally
significantly less than for teachers or for social workers.
As a result, it was nearly impossible to draw what it
viewed as "more desirable" students. Springfield officials
hoped that its candidates would be from the "better sort,"
refined young women with "diction and the right style,"
those with more education (a significant proportion of
students in the twenties lacked a high school diploma) who
could presumably better minister to the needs of the middle
classes flocking to the hospitals. In hopes of reaching
this better sort, hospital recruiters made regular
presentations at area high schools. To woo the most
promising young women, recruiters also staged elaborate
receptions at the new nurse's residence to show off the
victrola, and grand carpets gracing the living room-
downstairs from the rather modest student quarters. [40]
None of these measures succeeded in bringing the
desired types of students to Springfield Hospital.
Conditions were too difficult and wages too low to get or
keep such "respectable" young women. Instead, it was the
ill educated and the unpolished who composed the core of
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the student staff. This proved a constant tug of war
between the nursing superintendent and students regarding
the proper comportment, disposition, and behavior of
nursing students.
Nursing Superintendent Blanche Blackman was a well-
educated and capable professional. Deeply respected by her
peers, she later served as president of the state nursing
association. Unfortunately, she couldn't help her students
become comparable professionals; Blackman's job was to
break her students, to turn them into pliable laborers.
Blackman rigidly controlled student nurses from
morning to night. At breakfast, she commanded students to
remain at their tables until she nodded her head and
excused the group. Following breakfast, she led mandatory
prayers. Then before going off to their duties, she
measured their uniforms; for reasons of style and comfort
(and mild mischief making) some students occasionally
surreptitiously shortened their skirts. Blackman
inspected every student to ensure their uniforms were not
more than ten inches from the floor.
While all students had to observe strict protocols on
virtually every aspect of their personal and working lives,
first year students were especially singled out. They were
probationers after all, the term connoting both a sentence
and the uncertainty that they must have felt about their
position. Blackman regularly punished students for a
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variety of infractions, suspending many and expelling
others. Her records are filled with notes like A
student was sent away for disobedience." "it was necessary
to allow four students to go home until such time as their
hair which they had bobbed had grown again." Students were
dropped from the rolls for being "unsatisfactory material."
In May of 1923, for example, one student was dismissed
because of what was referred to as "a prolonged but
thoroughly concealed disobedience" of the prohibition on
fraternizing with male staff members. She hinted that the
accused had associated with someone below her class (or
would-be class), and possibly that she had become pregnant.
Blackman's ruling in all such matters was final, and
usually not very elaborate. More typical was the case of a
student who was dropped from the rolls in March 1926
because "she lacked the qualities that we deemed to be
desirable" or the student in the spring of 1929 whose
resignation was requested. No explanation was offered or
needed. [41]
Student nurses' experience was similar to that of
other Springfield medical personnel—notably interns. In
some large urban hospitals interns were regarded as
ambitious upstarts who threatened the preeminence and
perogatives of senior staff. Not at Springfield; interns
were treated as indentured servants more than fearsome
young rivals.
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As with student nurses, the principal appeal of
interns was that they provided cheap labor. Although
internships were supposed to provide instruction and hands
on experience, interns' day-to-day assignments involved
mostly the scut work of taking histories, conducting exams
and performing lab tests for senior staff. Such duties
were typically learned in a matter of hours or days but
were then done for months to spare senior staff the chores
Aside from serving senior staff, interns served the
general ward and the outpatient department. As with
student nurses, interns subsidized Springfield's care of
the lower classes while allowing senior physicians time to
attend to more affluent patients and to cultivate
referrals
.
[42
]
Interns were ill equipped to handle the constant
stream of outpatients. They had too little time and too
little experience. They complained of offering haphazard
care. They decried the separate and unequal treatment
accorded inpatient and outpatient divisions, in which
inpatient services got the lion's share of attention and
resources, and urged that senior staff and administrators
take action. Their pleas went unheeded. The division
between outpatient and inpatient care would last for
decades. [43
]
Deplorable conditions in the outpatient department
were the result of interns' crushing responsibilities
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combined with the almost total absence of guidance by
senior staff. Senior staff demanded much from interns yet
made little effort to teach them in return. Few ever took
the time to discuss cases with interns or to point out
important facts and findings. [44
]
Some staff members coaxed their fellows to involve
interns more in their regular rounds. One urged "that
private and semi-private patients be made more use of as
teaching material" to benefit the interns. Others
suggested that staff members systematically monitor the
interns' performance "...that after interns have cases
worked up, visiting men review their work for approval or
constructive criticism." No formal action was taken. And
Superintendent Walker usually steered clear of matters
related to interns' training. Senior staff continued to
neglect systematic instruction of interns. [45]
Walker's reluctance to challenge senior staff
regarding teaching responsibilities was just one indication
that the real power at Springfield rested with the senior
staff. Senior staff were generally Springfield's most
skilled and experienced physicians; the ones who held major
appointments, who had full privileges in matters of patient
admissions and treatment, who determined Springfield's
policies, who commanded the attention of trustees, and
dominated everyone below them. [46]
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comprising less than thirty percent of Springfield's
physicians, senior staff were predominantly white male
native born Protestants, many of them from old yankee
families of long residence in Springfield. Many hailed
from the finest medical schools of Boston and New York;
many won wide recognition including the presidency of the
local medical society, the presidency of the state hospital
association, the presidency of the New England Surgical
Society, and the presidency of the national radiology
society. [47]
Staff meetings were held at the tony Colony Club—one
of the gathering spots for the city's social elite. Though
the meetings were convivial occasions they were not solely
social events. Typically after dinner and a brief report
from the medical staff president, special presentations
followed usually consisting of general talks on subjects
like the thyroid gland, gall bladder disease, or the
treatment of diabetes with insulin, along with perplexing
cases that physicians wanted to share and discuss with
their colleagues. [48]
Patient deaths were rarely discussed. Reading of the
"casualty" list was perfunctory and invariably the
assembled unanimously ruled that deaths were caused by the
primary disease with no discussion of how to handle such
cases in the future. Occasionally the superintendent
dissented and remarked that faulty sterilization of
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instruments or other unnamed (or unrecorded) mishaps had
caused a particular casualty. After his comment, the
meeting continued as usual. Without an ongoing monitoring
committee, physicians couldn't be closely supervised; there
was no means of directing physicians in standard ways;
sanctions could not be imposed on physicians for mistakes-
assuming mistakes were ever discovered. [49]
In 1928, a few senior staff members tried to institute
monthly group meetings to discuss what were referred to as
"poor results" including wrong diagnosis, preventable
deaths, and infections. They couched this proposal in
terms of collegial learning and teaching but it caused
considerable resentment even though attendance and
participation was voluntary. The proposal was not
implemented for more than twenty years. [50]
Superintendents Gardiner and Walker were more
insistent that senior staff maintain proper records.
Apparently there were growing problems with routine patient
record keeping in the twenties. Patient charts lacked
vital information; surgical notes included conflicting
statements; interns' accounts of patients' progress clashed
with those of attending staff; physicians failed to file
patient progess reports, to take notes at admittance or
discharge, to take histories or exams before operations,
and were vague about what was done during operations. In
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general, one quarter to one half of patient records were
incomplete at any given time. [51]
On several occasions, the Superintendent implored the
staff to be more careful. He flattered them when they
temporarly made modest improvements and threatened them
with disciplinary action when they returned to their usual
habits. Nothing he did made a difference.
What was happening here? Possibly, physicians were
becoming less vigilant about record-keeping. m the
twenties and thirties a flood of new patients meant a
staggering amount of additional record keeping (especially
for city and state agencies for reimbursement purposes)
which took time away from patient care. Some physicians
let the paperwork slip rather than patient care. Moreover,
agencies such as the American Medical Association, the
American College of Surgeons, the American Hospital
Association, also insisted on more exact standards for
medical care. All of which necessitated more elaborate
record keeping and tighter control over patient records.
Physicians were told to hold frequent staff
conferences, to meet periodically to review and analyze
hospital work, to be vigilant about attendance at staff
meetings, and to produce thorough minutes of staff
meetings. Such information was needed so that accrediting
organizations could examine and evaluate hospital
standards. Accreditation was said to be crucial if
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Springfield was to continue to draw medical students,
physicians, nurses, patients, and support generally from
the community.
Despite the stated importance of staff attendance at
meetings, physicians' attendance records were dismal.
Superintendent Walker and the chair of the medical staff
tried repeatedly to coax more physicians to attend
reminding them that their presence was "tangible proof of
their interests in the hospital" and that "it was their
major chance to express their views and to influence
hospital policy." These pleas had no discernible effect on
the staff. Physicians had good reason not to attend
meetings. Given the divisions within the hospital, staff
meetings were not usually occasion for much comradery.
Owing to the senior staff's stranglehold on policy, junior
staff had little reason to participate. Moreover, due to
competition among the senior staff, staff members were more
likely to bicker than to be cheerful with one another.
Also, whatever their status, physicians faced persistent
new pressures from the Superintendent and outsiders which
they could resist but never eliminate. Lastly, financial
shortfalls meant delays in getting needed supplies and made
expansion almost impossible. The staff had little power to
remedy the situation.
Despite their vaunted corporate affiliations and
allegiances, Springfield physicians were individualistic
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in the twenties and thirties; freedom to decide their own
methods of practice was sacrosanct to Springfield
physicians. Now, in the name of professionalism, they were
pressured to surrender a portion of this precious right.
Their response was to resist demands of colleagues and
outsiders whenever possible and they withdrew from new
responsibilities whenever they could. [52]
Springfield's physicians were successful in rebuffing
stringent regulations until well after World War Two.
Administrators allowed them to straggle along at minimum
standards of accreditation organizations, content to
operate at provisional status. [53]
Impact Of The Depress inn
In the early months of the depression, few in
Springfield realized the severity of the economic crisis.
The Chamber Of Commerce, for example, called conditions
"basically good." It was difficult to remain optimistic
however, when unemployment hit twenty-five percent in 19 3 2
and stayed there for more than two years. Springfield
residents lost more than their jobs; some lost their
marriages and homes and became tramps; some lost their
minds and became "mental cases. "[54]
By the early 1930s, Springfield's welfare spending
amounted to ten times what it had been earlier but this
still wasn't enough to meet the emergency; city agencies,
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however, had no more money to spend. Meanwhile, charity
organizations were in no better shape; far more people used
their services but contributions had tumbled. [55]
In lieu of giving money, city officials tried to
provide for the needy by hiring them for juries, by
distributing coal and flour, by establishing public
gardens, and by organizing football and basketball
fundraisers. For those who weren't satisfied with city
aid, the Joyland Palace held dance marathons where
contestants, except for comfort breaks and cat naps,
shuffled around and around and around for weeks at a
time. [56]
Under pressure from labor groups and others, city
officials tried to shake industry's money tree; local
manufacturers resisted the shakedown saying their branches
were bare. In response, city officials called the wealthy
uncooperative, selfish, and irresponsible. Some observers
predicted riots and revolution. The Chamber Of Commerce,
fearing potential social stife, finally took action. It
formed a task force to recommend ways unemployed workers
might best use their limitless leisure—aside from staging
rent parties, pounding the pavement, foraging for food, or
copulating.
In the early years of the depression, city officials
insisted that Springfield could fully provide for its
indigent and therefore, could do without outside
67
governmental aid. The mayor's stance was that if all
helped out, everyone would get by. Unfortunately, while
his voluntaristic vision was uplifting, the support and
cash to realize it never materialized.
Funding adequate health care by city agencies, private
charities, and hospitals was very difficult because the
legions of unemployed and underemployed and their families
were more susceptible to disease, and suffered elevated
rates of tuberculosis, pneumonia, and infant illnesses and
yet couldn't pay for treatment. m a sense, this was a
reprise of Springfield's experience in the past decade but
on a much larger scale. [57]
With far more patients unable to pay their bills,
Springfield Hospital's yearly deficit mushroomed. In
response, the business office issued stern reminders to
late payers, asked for payment prior to operations, and
paid collectors to track down patients with delinquent
bills. [58]
Concerned that patients might be "trying to secure a
bargain," medical staff leaders urged physicians to
carefully assay patients' financial health before deciding
on admittance, and to skimp on testing whenever possible.
Social workers spent even more time than before trying to
determine which patients were 'deserving' and which were
not. [59]
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outpatients were a particular problem for
Springfield^s smooth functioning. Outpatient department
Clinics like Child guidance, cardiac, and dermatological
,
continued to grow far more rapidly than the rest of the
facility; yet, few of the thousands who came by monthly
could pay for their care. Superintendent Walker called the
department a serious financial drain and a detriment; he
wanted to review its status and enact maximum quotas for
clinics. In. the end, though, he did nothing. Springfield
did not want to risk public condemnation by turning away
large numbers of the needy. [60]
Staff physicians tried to devise ways to bring more
paying patients into the hospital. One encouraged hospital
trustees to get directly involved in "selling" the
hospital, "why don't more acccident cases come to the
hospital? Haven't our trustees any influence with city
police or factory managements that can be brought to bear
on this matter?" This followed a general discussion in the
medical staff as to whether or not accident cases were
financially rewarding to the hospital. [61]
The depression experience did not knit together the
medical staff. To the contrary, it widened existing staff
divisions. In Springfield, as elsewhere, there was more
competition among doctors during a decade in which
physician incomes in general declined precipitously and
those of general practitioners fell even more.
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In an economy in which much care was paid by barter,
every solvent patient counted. Those physicians who
monopolized certain procedures commanded extra fees but
antagonized their peers and exacerbated staff infighting a:
witnessed by the controversy concerning who could
administer anesthesia and collect the accompanying fees.
Superintendent Walker referred to "selfish interests" at
work and "thoughts of personal gain" outweighing other
considerations. This was a fight over turf and expertise
within the medical staff. To the victor would go the
commensurate rewards. Whether or not the victor was the
best qualified to administer anesthesthia was another
matter. Left unaddressed by Walker and other hospital
officials through the decade was the question of who would
decide such questions. Tensions remained
.[ 62
]
Springfield Hospital's finances had always rested on
patient fees and donations, and to a lesser extent
government and charitable aid. Unfortunately, sizable
legacies were rare windfalls. Patients were notoriously
unreliable about paying their bills; more than half of
chronically ill patients paid nothing at all, and
contributions of twenty-five to fifty cents per patient
from the Community Chest and city agencies failed to cover
hospital costs. Investments in the thirties produced
paltry returns and dividends .[ 63
]
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Trustees sought more reliable sources of income; they
got the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare to
assume a larger share of the costs for indigent cases;
arranged with the federal Veterans' Bureau to care for its
clients; and pried welfare payments from surrounding towns
Springfield's reliance on government support was a return
to its earliest days and for similar reasons; individuals
whether benefactors or patients or volunteers were unable
to fund the hospital on their own. [64]
Increased government support was crucial to the
survival of Springfield's healthcare institutions in the
thirties. Until the depression years, city officials had
viewed healthcare mostly as a private matter, their own
role largely limited to monitoring and quarantining those
with contagious diseases along with providing modest
contributions for hospital care for the indigent and a
clinic for venereal disease (vd) patients. Once the
depression hit, health care outlays were cut by twenty-fiv
percent and the vd clinic closed; the money was needed for
schools, for the fire and police departments, and for
emergency relief.
The VNA was one of the health care groups hardest hit
by the depression. Like others, it saw its budget cut,
staff reduced, services curtailed for emergencies, child
welfare, and deliveries. The VNA and affiliated groups
were unable to serve the many needs of masses of destitute
persons at a ti,»e when one quarter of the population was
receiving Com,unity Chest aid and three quarters of that
went for emergency relief.
Chest leaders rallied the community to assume greater
responsibility for social welfare generally and health care
in particular. They called on city officials to increase
monies for free beds and outpatient clinics. Chest leaders
declared that adequate health care was "vital to democracy"
and a social right. As in the twenties, the VNA and
kindred groups called on city leaders to devote more
resources for healthcare. Unlike the twenties, however,
this time their appeals were taken seriously by government
officials. [65]
Social problems that had earlier been neglected by
politicians and the public now became major social
concerns. Springfield officials, like their counterparts
across the country, could not long ignore the plight of the
poor when their numbers doubled during the depression—the
vast majority of them had never asked or needed help
before. City officials could no longer ignore charitable
groups like the Chest which spoke out on behalf of the
indigent. A profound shift occurred in public attitudes
about government aid; what had been regarded as a
beneficence now was claimed as a right, what had had been a
social disgrace had now become a matter of basic dignity;
Soon, politicians like Mayors Dwight Winter and Henry
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sMartens "found" substantially
.ore
.oney for social welfare
including health care because they knew that otherwise they
would be suimarily booted from office, city outlays for
hospital care alone increased by ten times from 1930 to the
mid-thirties. [66J
Conclusi on
By the end of the thirties, charitable organizations
had succeeded in helping to expand and improve the city'
health care resources. Some Chest officials wanted to g,
further; they spoke of broader social planning to assure
adequate health care. Such ideas did not get very far;
their proponents were outsiders or minor players in the
health care hierarchy who lacked any significant leverage
in area hospitals, local politics, or the business or
professional elite. [67]
As the city physician noted in 1938, Springfield's
health care remained "fragmented and uncoordinated."
Health care devolved onto individual physicians at
individual hospitals--notably Springf ield--with little
effort to organize services within hospitals or between
them or to coordinate hospital services with charitable
organizations or city agencies. [68]
Springfield Hospital's experience and that of the city
generally highlighted the weakness of the supposed vanguard
of American medicine whether specialists, medical school
deans, or hospital administrators. Though Springfield was
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no backwater institution in the thirties, its general
practitioners generally reigned supreme. Springfield
physicians successfully obstructed efforts to change the
organization or delivery of services.
Physicians' sovereignity rested on maximum
professional autonomy; the result had been systematic
disarray; total autonomy led to increased staff divisions,
poor service, low standards, and weak education. Yet,
physicians' insistence on autonomy trumped other interests
who lacked comparable professional authority. Neither
administrators nor foundations, neither medical schools,
accrediting agencies, or government filled the breach. Not
until after World War Two did Springfield Hospital begin to
develop an organizational structure commensurate with its
growing importance to area residents.
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CHAPTER 4
SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL 1940-1960
"Hundreds of people... for the first time have the
means of paying... to remove some burden from mind and
body " reported the Springfield Union in May of 1943.
During World War Two, Springfield's prominence as an arms'
manufacturing center resulted in boom times for workers
employed at Smith and Wesson, the Colt company, and other
area firms. Many of these workers enrolled in company-
sponsored insurance plans which had been first introduced
in the late thirties but had dramatically expanded during
wartime. By 1943 an estimated one half of daily admissions
were carrying some sort of insurance. By 1944, the
hospital derived the majority of its patient income from
these sources. [1]
Although more people were covered by insurance plans
than before, patient admissions remained level with those
of the pre-war years. Due to staff shortages, (more than
one third of Springfield's physicians as well as many
nurses served abroad) , as well as rationing of medical
supplies, Springfield could not significantly expand its
services. Following the war however, with the return of
hospital personnel, continued prosperity, increasing
numbers of persons covered by insurance as well as by
public agencies, Springfield registered remarkable growth
82
in patient admissions and treatment. The emergency unit
and outpatient surgery department, the laboratories and x-
ray services all reported increases, sometimes jumping
fifteen to twenty-five percent annually. [2]
By the late 1950s, more than 70% of Springfield's
patients received health care through a combination of
private insurance plans, federal, state, and city aid, and
private relief agencies, of all these programs, insurance
was the most important; Springfield residents were among
the more than 100 million Americans (up from 30 million in
1945)
—covering more than half of the country's population
-who received health insurance from one of more than 500
insurance companies
.[ 3
]
While health insurance immeasurably improved the well
being and peace of mind for millions of Americans, it was
not always a satisfactory arrangement for patients or
providers. Insurance plans usually paid a fraction of
hospital and physician fees. In the mid 50s, they covered
one quarter of private expenses for health services which
is one reason why loans for medical expenses were the
mainstay of small loan companies. Insurance plans which
typically covered a small portion of charges for acute
conditions (leaving out many services like medications,
rehabilitation, and home health care) , had no provisions
for treatment for those with chronic medical problems and
barred persons with preexisting conditions. Some insurers
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did Offer special policies dubbed major medical plans to
cover their own existing gaps in coverage but these were
too expensive for most Americans-less than 10% of whom had
major medical protection by i960. [4]
Blue cross and Blue Shield were the two major non-
profit corporations that tried to cover the gaps of the
private insurers. Aside from their regular subscribers,
they also enrolled the elderly, the chronically ill, and
others locked out of private insurance plans. Unlike the
private insurers, they initially offered the same plan to
all subscribers at the same cost in a given community and
thus kept premiums relatively low for those with greater
medical expenses. The "Blues" however steadily lost
customers in the fifties to insurance companies offering
cheaper plans to healthier enrollees, leaving Blue Cross
and Blue Shield with the more costly patients. As a
result, premiums were raised, which further drove policy
holders into the arms of the "privates" and ultimately made
policies too expensive for many, especially the elderly
living on fixed incomes. [5]
Government agencies, whether city, state, or federal,
were supposed to cover the gaps of the privates and the
Blues. Unfortunately, state programs typically paid just
one half of actual patient costs. Hospitals in turn tried
to make up the shortfall by charging private insurers more
who then passed on the added expense to their enrollees.
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all of which made insurance more difficult to afford for
everyone. [6]
Springfield's difficulties wresting adequate fees from
third party payors came at a time when the Hospital's
financial situation had become more volatile than ever
before. Expenses soared due to rapid increases in the cost
of labor and supplies, and the added expenses of new
services, the decision by Springfield trustees and
physicians to expand its medical education program and to
construct many new facilities, and increasing government
regulations. Planning budgets and then working within them
thereby became a more difficult enterprise. And unlike
earlier years, trustees could no longer settle accounts
with a check at the end of the year. [7]
To make up for the shortfall, Springfield regularly
raised its rates for patients covered by private health
insurance. In the fifties, Springfield increased its rates
from five to fifteen percent a year—double the previous
decade and more than double the inflation rate overall.
These were astonishing figures given that revenues from
patients had soared four hundred percent since 1945. [8]
Springfield battled constantly with third party payors
to obtain contracts that would provide some significant
portion of the hospital's operating costs. Hospital
administrators insisted that payors pony up the actual
costs of services incurred by the hospital, wrangling with
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Blue cross and Blue Shield, insurance companies, the
Wor3c.en^s Compensation Insurance Commission, the Department
Of welfare, and the Community chest. The disputes centered
on Whether payors should pay for the cost of their specific
patients alone, or the more general costs borne by the
hospital including medical education, outpatient, non-
payors, and so on. How to define "usual" versus "special"
charges, how to decide who would determine these, how to
enforce these rates, and the means to challenge them as
appropriate was the subject of continual negotiations in
the 1950s.
Springfield's officials fretted over the many
individuals who were unable to get group health insurance
coverage (which provided the best coverage at the least
cost) because of retirement, self
-employment or employment
in small businesses. According to Springfield's business
office, the only option for 'insurance orphans' was to buy
individual policies with "high premiums and very little
protection," for whom claims were often rejected because
"of certain well hidden clauses in the policies." The
business office concluded, "many policy holders ...judge
the workings of the voluntary health insurance
unsatisfactory .
"
[ 9
]
Hospital officials issued guidelines to the medical
staff explaining which insurance policies covered which
procedures urging them to make sure that patients had
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sufficient insurance coverage before ordering tests, and
conducting thorough exa.s lest the patient's insurer fail
to cover the charges and the patient fail to .ake up the
difference leaving Springfield stuck with the bill. Also,
even inore than before, the outpatient department and
emergency room became both the "doctor's office" for the
indigent and the hardpressed and the preferred site of
treatment for those without means in order to save beds for
paying patients. These two departments outstripped nearly
all others in the 40s and 50s in their increase in patient
admissions
.
[ 10]
Elderly Springfield residents had the most difficult
time paying for medical care. As was true nationally, they
used health services more frequently than others and had
greater health care expenses. Most insurance companies
denied them coverage, cancelled coverage when they reached
a certain age, or charged them prohibitively high
premiums—representing about 15% of their income— for
policies that covered very little. [11]
The Springfield Visiting Nurse Association helped the
many elderly who could not afford hospital care, or who had
been released precipitously from Springfield and other
hospitals, or who could not afford to enter a nursing home.
Most of the elderly ill lived alone-"shut-ins"-and were
left to fend for themselves, though VNA staff judged 20% of
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their patients should have been receiving immediate
hospital care. [12]
The VNA provided as best they could for shut-ins but
due to meagre private funding and a dangerously heavy
caseload, VNA leaders found it practically impossible to
hire or retain competent committed nurses. Moreover, with
too many patients to care for, it was impossible to provide
any of them decent care, causing much frustration and
anguish among the nurses. The average thrice weekly visit
lasted just 4 3 minutes though many patients needed daily
visits for much longer periods. [13]
In one respect, though, the elderly served by the VNA
were the lucky ones. At least they had some privacy and
individual attention unlike the elderly poor lodged at the
city's decrepit "infirmary." There, they shared jammed
quarters with homeless families and unmarried pregnant
women, along with the retarded and mentally ill. Due to
understaf f ing (and underfunding) , the city physician
visited each patient approximately 30 seconds per day,
"inmates" went without night time attendants, and apple
sauce was the staple food. [14]
Springfield officials were reluctant to turn away
indigent patients, but could not afford to take them all
free of charge. That is why throughout the 4 0s and 50s,
Springfield administrators spent an inordinate share of
their time and energy at meetings and conferences.
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wrestling with the "all important reimbursable cost
problem... The hospital constantly tussled with public
agencies over funding arrangements, reaching temporary
agreements which were then rendered inoperable because of
rising costs. [15]
Raising rates and the cost shifting that such
increases were partly designed to enforce was partly
Springfield's answer to stinginess of government and non-
profit agencies. Springfield had an even greater problem
with these payors than with private ones regarding full and
timely payments. Hospital officials constantly complained
about one sided, unfair arrangements where these were
concerned. Neither government agencies nor the non-profits
ever seemed willing to allocate what physicians and
administrators deemed reasonable sums for payment. [16]
In the late fifties, Springfield, along with other
hospitals, asked the Massachusetts Hospital Association to
analyze hospitals' average costs so that state auditors
could then determine satisfactory rates. The Association
duly devised what it deemed appropriate guidelines, but
these were rejected by the State. Springfield and sister
hospitals throughout the state then fixed on other means to
make up the shortfall. In anticipation of meagre payments
from the non-profits and public agencies, they raised rates
well in advance of new rates set by state bodies. They
created a new .'entrance charge,', but this was quickly
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discovered and banned by the Department of Public Health;
they next tried to tack on an increased room rate for thl
first 5 days of patient stays. This too was struck down by
State of f icials. [17]
Area-wide planning of services by Springfield's
hospitals might have helped reduce costs. And in fact,
beginning in 1946, federal legislation required that
hospitals join planning ventures as a prerequisite for
obtaining government loans for expansion purposes.
Hospitals were to coordinate services under the auspices of
state health departments on a local, state, and regional
basis, would devise plans to meet present demands for
health care and to anticipate future needs. However, these
planning boards remained paper organizations through the
fifties, and Washington simply issued the equivalent of
blank checks to enable Springfield and sister institutions
to expand their respective domains without any outside
interference. Hospital planning would not occur until the
mid sixties, and only under enormous pressure from state
agencies and the public; even then planning was done only
to a very modest degree and with much ambivalence by
administrators, trustees, and physicians. Until then,
Springfield officials' attitude about planning was simply,
'If we don't build the beds, someone else will. '[18]
Springfield and hospitals generally objected to inter-
hospital planning ventures because these were to be
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controlled by outsiders, especially state agencies;
furthermore, their plans might have become compulsory, and
therefore could result in reduction of services or restrict
Springfield's future expansion. However, Hospital
Officials did embrace a planning proposal in 1946 presented
by representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation. The
Foundation in conjunction with physician and hospital
associations, government agencies, leading insurance
companies, and several major corporations had launched a
planning effort that would be wholly voluntary, privately
administered, and locally based.
The Foundation's proposal called for Springfield to
become a full-fledged medical center and to constitute
itself as the hub of a regional hospital network in the
Pioneer Valley. The proposal called on Springfield to
launch several new units, to purchase thousands of dollars'
worth of new equipment, to form several new departments, to
expand others, and to hire scores of new staff. [19]
The proposal met with enthusiasm from trustees,
administrators, and physicians, eager to revitalize
Springfield's operations after more than a decade of
straitened circumstances. A "Future of Springfield
Committee" was soon formed; Committee members quickly
determined that radical changes were in order— especially
having to do with medical practice. Committee members
believed that to improve and expand hospital services, it
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would be necessary to reduce the medical staff's
prerogatives. To assure higher standards of medical
practice, closer oversight of physician performance was
warranted. Committee members also believed that to meet
the growing responsibilities imposed on hospitals by
insurers, state agencies, and the courts (in the matter of
liability), while satisfying the public's higher
expectations for quality health care, physicians needed to
be more accountable to hospital officials and under tighter
control of medical staff and hospital governing
authorities. [20]
News of the Committee's intentions caused a near
revolt of some of Springfield's leading physicians
including the Chair of the Staff Council. In January of
1947, Dr. W.A.R. Chapin delivered a speech to the
Council in which he accused the trustees, the
superintendent, and elements of the medical staff of
upending traditional aproaches to medical care. He charged
that the Committee and the Board had unilaterally overruled
the Council's policy that physicians new to Springfield
serve in a voluntary capacity in the outpatient department
before receiving formal appointments, and that the
committee had engineered a rush of promotions through the
staff council without the approval of the staff council.
He also claimed the committee supplanted the staff council
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as the major governing body of the hospital, thereby
creating a breach between the board and the staff. [21]
Chapin's declaration was a bit overblown. After all,
four of the six members of the staff council were members
of the new committee. if this was a takeover, it was
partly from above. But Chapin was clearly on the mark in
stating that the committee had supplanted the authority of
the staff council; half of the committee's members were
from the outpatient staff-men of short tenure and junior-
not senior- staff. Clearly, Chapin represented a large
portion of Springfield's staff; in the coming years, they
would even occasionally outvote the insurgents. But
Superintendent Eugene Walker and his allies were not
dissuaded by the broadside. Walker even confirmed many of
Chapin 's charges. He defiantly remarked that if the staff
was edged aside in some matters, it was "due to their own
shortcomings." He granted that the medical staff had
autonomy over medical matters but not over administrative
policies; in those matters the Superintendent and trustees
had proper purview, that in any event the Board's
responsibility over the institution took precedence over
that of the staff or the superintendent. Like Chapin,
Walker was also being disingenuous. What were now declared
administrative matters (and so the job of the
superintendent and trustees) had long been conducted by the
staff alone.
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The effort to broaden physicians' responsibilities and
to reduce their independence led to a long lasting tug of
war between reformers (the "young turks" as they were
called) and the hospital's old guard. Reformers tried to
convince other members of the medical staff that
relinquishing a measure of their independence and assuming
new responsibilities would actually enhance their
professional status. Springfield would vastly improve its
functioning and staff members would thereby enjoy greater
prestige, more hospital resources, increased patient
referrals, and higher incomes.
Reformers shared several things in common; most were
young men, specialists, Jewish, and, most importantly,
veterans. As military physicians, their wartime experience
had provided intensive training that otherwise might have
taken many years of medical practice. They had learned
about the latest new drugs and therapies and the most
advanced methods of diagnosis and treatment. They had
assumed responsibilities and leadership roles that, as
junior physicians back in Springfield, would have been
closed to them. Following military service, many of them
had taken specialty courses in Boston, New York, and other
centers of medical education and research. After
completing those programs and returning to Springfield,
they had much higher expectations of the institution than
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their colleagues, and clear ideas about how to meet the
local health care challenges of the postwar period. [22]
Many of the veterans were Jews who had earlier
experienced discrimination at Springfield in staff
assignments and in promotions-not to mention the slights
and stings of being treated as social outcasts by the
city's elite. However, following the war, anti-semitism
had generally declined due to its association with nazism.
Also, Jewish veterans had acguired a degree of medical
expertise that could not be ignored or dismissed and was in
great demand. And above all, Jewish veterans had served
their country and now claimed their rightful place; they
could no longer be denied a say in shaping hospital
policies. [23]
Revamping medical education was key to reformers'
plans for expansion. Interns were to be key figures in the
new medical education program. Increasing the numbers and
quality of interns (and later residents) would help
visiting physicians attend to the growing numbers of
patients; interns would largely staff the outpatient
clinics and wards; their medical school training would
provide visiting staff with exposure to the most up-to-date
therapies and diagnostic techniques, and their post-
graduate training at Springfield would provide them the
experience necessary to become top-notch practitioners.
All of this would put the hospital in the good graces of
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accreditation authorities, the Springfield community,
government agencies, and private insurance companies.
During the war, few doctors had given the time and
energy to properly train interns. As a teaching hospital,
senior staff were supposed to closely involve interns in
their activities, to discusss cases with them, to generally
help interns integrate their theoretical training with
practical experience. Yet, most doctors refused to be
mentors. As before, interns largely unassisted tried to
learn their trade on the general wards where the poor and
elderly were unlikely to register complaints against what
was at best lackluster care. [24]
The word went out on the medical school grapevine in
the early forties that an internship at Springfield was a
wasted year. Springfield was unable to get enough interns
to staff its ward service. As the situation deteriorated,
Springfield took virtually any medical school graduate who
applied. Some were barely competent, and others were
chosen "out of pity and despair ." [25]
In the years following the war, many physicians still
refused to aid the educational program; they were unwilling
to increase the number of autopsies, which would have
increased the amount of "material" available for study by
house staff. Many physicians devoted only minimal time to
ward service or outpatient clinics, leading to further
overwork of the house staff. Of those physicians who
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grudgingly participated in the educational program,
.any
preferred "didactic conferences," in which interns would
simply observe their senior colleagues during patient
treatment rather than participating in any meaningful
fashion, in order to avoid imposing on senior staff's
patients. Meanwhile, in the late forties, interns worked
far above the national norm of 12 0 hours a week and because
of understaffing one intern often had to cover an entire
ward for months at a time. When they faltered, student
nurses were pressed into service for duties they were
utterly unprepared for. [26]
Senior staff not only neglected intern training in the
war years and immediately afterwards, they also neglected
their own post-graduate education. Few attended post-
graduate classes, despite Superintendent Walker's
entreaties and occasional reminders from some senior staff.
Few physicians engaged in ongoing self-education efforts
either; the library depended on castoffs and donations, and
received paltry grants from the Staff Council of just one
hundred dollars a year. Such a pittance reflected the fact
that few physicians spent any time there. [27]
Following the war, as before, hospital leaders
appealed to the medical staff to fully support the
educational program. As before, the requests had little
impact. Now, however, sanctions were finally imposed
against indifferent and recalcitrant physicians; pressure
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from accrediting organizations (especially the AMA which
was now under control of specialists and academic
physicians) was the precipitating cause here. The limited
scope of the education program and the limited involvement
of senior staff threatened to jeopardize the hospital's
standing and destroy plans for expansion. [28
]
In 1951, physicians were informed that henceforth
participation in the educational program would be a
condition for staff appointment, reappointment and hospital
privileges. Furthermore, junior staff were told that if
they participated energetically in the education program
they could expect rapid promotion; seniority would no
longer be decisive in determining a physician's status and
clout. Loyal and active younger men could now leapfrog
over presumed deadwood in the hospital. [29]
By the mid late fifties, the education program had
finally taken root. A full time Director of Education had
been appointed and was in clear command. Senior staff were
more thoroughly involved in the education program than ever
before, holding regular rounds and conferences, and using
their private patients to instruct interns. Interns were
finally assigned specific operating rooms to guarantee that
they would gain experience in surgery. The library was
fully funded and amply stocked, and large numbers of
physicians attended continuing education programs
.[ 30]
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As with the matter of physician involvement in intern
education, until the postwar period, the use of anesthesia
had been entirely the prerogative of Springfield
physicians. The only exception was that gas anesthesia not
be given to "anyone under fifteen or any colored person."
Aside from this stipulation, anesthesia was not regulated
either by the medical staff or hospital superintendent.
Hospital officials simply hoped that "eventually" a given
anesthesia might be administered in the same way at all
times. [31]
The pitfalls of the laisse-faire approach were
illustrated in 1943 when two patients died because of
improper application of sodium penthathol. In the absence
of detailed patient records from Springfield and comparable
institutions, it is impossible to determine the
circumstances surrounding these deaths. Still, the tragedy
and its aftermath is worth noting. Apparently, the case
was never investigated by legal authorities and no
sanctions were taken against those at fault. Following the
incident, senior medical staff members did ask that sodium
penthathol be used only in "selected cases," but failed to
define what "selected cases" meant or who would then be
allowed to apply sodium penthathol. By the late forties,
however, with the adoption of a more rigorous regime
overseeing physicians, Springfield had established an
Anesthesiology department which imposed strict guidelines
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to determine physician competency to administer the various
types of anesthesia
.[ 32
]
increased oversight of medical practice was also
evident in the formation of the Medical Audit Committee in
the late forties. The committee was responsible for the
thorough and timely compilation and review of all medical
records especially those having to do with complications,
deaths, infections, and wrong diagnoses.
With comprehensive medical records, and proper regular
evaluation of them, physicians, hospital administrators,
and accreditation agencies could better gauge the
performance and quality of Sprngfield's medical care and
problems could be brought to light and corrected.
The Medical Audit Committee was in the vanguard of
reformers at Springfield Hospital. Some staff physicians
fought the committee's actions at every turn, trying to
keep the committee small and powerless; the few who were
allowed to serve were overwhelmed by the work. In the
early years of its existence, committee members were
reduced to sending out letters to physicians, outlining
their responsibilities and the expectations of the hospital
as far as adequate and complete records were concerned. [33
]
Relegated to the most basic accumulation and
maintenance of records as far as monitoring doctors was
concerned, Committee members walked softly and carried a
thin reed. However, once Springfield faced losing its
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accreditation over the matter, laggards were told they
would lose admitting privileges or be passed over for
promotions. They soon fell in line and the committee was
able to properly do its job. [34]
Another fracas involving an oversight body occurred in
1952 when Springfield formed a tissue committee to better
evaluate surgeon's work and to rate their competence.
In response, several doctors-particular ly surgeons-called
for a combined Tissue and Medical Audit Committee.
Surgeons who abhorred more extensive evaluation of their
own work reasoned—correctly—that if the Committee had to
do both, it would likely do neither well, or by default, it
would concentrate on narrow record keeping. [35]
Accreditation authorities eventually entered the fray,
insisting that Springfield abide by national standards for
evaluation of surgeons. Soon the Tissue Committee was up
and running. As in other disputes of the postwar period,
some Springfield doctors succeeded in forestalling changes,
but were ultimately compelled to implement them, under
edict from outside agencies and the efforts of internal
reformers. [36]
Most Springfield doctors supported the hospital's
restructuring and the expansion of the local health care
system in the fifties. Springfield doctors proudly
highlighted hospital developments as a model of advances in
medicine and surgery, in diagnosis and treatment. However,
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physicians were fearful about the consequences of such
changes. Springfield physicians felt pressured to adopt
methods that at times seemed more akin to a mass production
system and worried that they might soon become creatures of
"hospital administrative militants" who would render them
powerless. Moreover, physicians felt locked in mortal
combat with outsiders over the organization, financing, and
delivery of health care, and saw that their cherished
independence steadily chipped away in a seemingly harebrain
maze of regulations, accreditation requirements, and
confiscatory arrangements with third party payors.
Embattled physicians seethed whenever Blue Cross and other
insurers revised its rates and coverage to the detriment of
hospitals and physicians and when they read of new state
laws restricting various aspects of medical practice. They
felt degraded by the increased powers of the state's
department of public health and resented the insurers
demands for needlessly complex multiforms for claims that
only covered half their costs. [37]
Springfield doctors had good reason to believe that
the government, the Blues, and the private insurers, were
all congenitally incapable of administrating health care in
a rational, fair, or productive way. This is why they had
favored the growth of private health insurance as the means
to avoid government control of the health care system.
Little did they realize that what would emerge in the
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postwar period would be a maddening hybrid characterized by
intrusive bureaucracy, dependency on a host of new outside
agencies, increased costs, and unfair rates of compensation
for medical services-just what opponents of government
control had fought against. [38]
It could be argued that by i960, Springfield had
embarked on a thorough transformation. By insisting that
doctors keep accurate records, by requiring them to be
seriously committed to the education program, and by
establishing means to evaluate physicians' competence, far-
sighted doctors, administrators, and trustees fundamentally
changed the hospital.
However, events at decade's end indicated that
Springfield's restructuring was by no means complete or
secure. Operating income failed to match expenses. The
major reason was that ward admissions, which had been less
than fifteen percent of total admissions in the early
1950s, soared to twenty-five percent by 1959—a striking
reversal of earlier trends. Springfield officials reported
that increasing health care costs was the reason for the
growth in ward admissions, and that elderly patients in
particular were less able to afford private health
insurance. Many of the new ward patients were unable to
pay in full for their care, others were subsidized by
government programs that covered a small portion of costs.
The hospital had to make hefty charge-off s, totalling
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hundreds of thousands of dollars, for bad debts, for free
work, and for underpayment from welfare cases. This led to
mounting deficits. Revenue from patients who paid out of
pocket and third party payors was not enough to make up the
shortfall. Springfield could have sharply raised its fees,
but chose not to. Apparently administrators feared adverse
community reaction, especially after so many other rate
increases in recent years. Also, if rates had been
increased much more, even more patients would have
defaulted on their bills and the hospital would fall into
worse straits. As a result, in 1958 and 1959, Springfield
faced serious financial problems, and to cover its losses
was forced to make abrupt large-scale transfers from its
endowment to its operating funds. [39]
As the situation deteriorated, Springfield's plans for
further expansion were put on hold; hospital leaders were
not sure if there was enough community support for such
expansion. This was understandable as in recent years the
hospital had not had to gauge community feeling before
embarking on building projects, instead relying on
government loans for the bulk of construction funds.
Hospital officials, previously confident that the apparent
benefits of expansion would be enough to win and sustain
community support, were no longer so certain. What to do?
Administrators and trustees explored the possibility of
hiring professional fundraisers.
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Hospital expansion had been the major balm for
physicians harried by increasing controls on their medical
practice. with the financial shortfall, departments like
surgery, pediatrics, anesthesiology, and pathology, vied
for funds, made appeals to would-be benefactors in annual
reports, vented their despair and outrage in letters to
high hospital officials, and used brinksmanship—complete
with resignations and threats to resign if such and such
was not bought, renovated, hired, and so on. [40]
The turmoil in the hospital caused great tensions
between the staff and the administration. Under terrible
pressure, administration officials were overwhelmed by the
hospital's problems. Trustees and medical staff
established a committee to try to determine appropriate
priorities and organizational structures for the
beleaguered institution. As early as 1957, such a
committee had been proposed, but had been rejected by
medical staff members who feared that the committee would
act as a cabal that would encroach on staff prerogatives
and overrule the opinion of medical staff. But with the
hospital on the verge of disaster, the medical staff
approved the proposal for a Joint Conference Committee.
Significantly, staff members were apparently influenced—as
they had been at so many crucial junctures in that decade
—
by reports and recommendations from the Hospital Council of
the AMA stressing the importance of such committees. One
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of the first acts of the committee was to hire an outside
consultant to examine the state of the hospital, and to
determine the "best methods of providing good and
sufficient administration."
The decisions to hire a consulting firm, and to form a
Joint Conference Committee, were sensible. Whether these
would lead to long-term solutions to Springfield's problems
was another matter altogether. It must have been ironic to
hospital leaders that the decade of the hospital's greatest
expansion, marked by a surge in patients, services,
equipment, and personnel, was also the period of the
greatest antagonism within the staff, the most ferocious
conflicts between staff members and administration, and
constant battles between Springfield and government
agencies, along with enduring financial strains. Efforts
to address these problems would consume the energies of
Springfield officials well into the 1960s.
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CHAPTER 5
SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL 1960-1980
By 1960, due to overcrowding, antiquated equipment,
and staff shortages, Springfield's functioning sank to
almost code blue status. Pathologists were unable to
perform basic duties because of contamination in their
makeshift space; laboratory personnel, due to abysmal
conditions, could no longer conduct accurate or
reproducible test procedures; due to substandard nursing
care, patients were developing infections and
complications. The most basic amenities and sanitary
measures were neglected; one enraged physician reported
that his patient's linen hadn't been changed in four days.
Close to half of physicians took their patients to other
area hospitals, and some openly spoke of switching hospital
allegiances. The pressure and problems took their toll on
the administration. In 1960 alone, the Comptroller, the
Nursing Supervisor, the Nursing Director, the Assistant
Executive Director, and the Executive Director all quit.[l]
The crisis in the nursing staff was particularly
acute. Large numbers of resignations steadily cut nursing
ranks. This posed a double threat to Springfield; due to
the nursing shortage—only half as many nurses were
employed as were needed—entire floors had to be closed,
costing the hospital thousands of dollars per month.
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Moreover, the nursing shortage foreclosed any possibility
Of future expansion. [2]
By the winter of 1962, Springfield's medical advisory
board reported that the Hospital no longer met its
Obligations, either to staff or to patients, and was on the
brink of disaster. Some months later, a senior staff
member reported, "many patients are going to other
hospitals. They are losing confidence in Springfield: they
feel the hospital and physicians cannot be depended on.
[Springfield's] public image continues to
deteriorate. ..." [3]
Nonetheless, Springfield Hospital survived the crisis.
It did so by accelerating its development into a regional
medical center and thereby expanding its scope of medical
services, widening its patient base and substantially
boosting its revenues. It also forged closer ties with
medical schools in Boston and Albany, and with Boston
hospitals. Private organizations and government agencies,
like the National Institutes of Health, the Dexter and the
Ford Foundations, and the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, all provided seed money for new
programs ranging from cardiac surgery to cancer
research. [4]
The financial problems of the early sixties dissipated
by mid-decade. Construction of new facilities drew new
inpatient admissions as did the growth of special services.
care
or
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The most important factor, however, in Springfield's
improved fortunes was the introduction in 1966 of Medi
and Medicaid, government supported health care programs f
millions Of the poor, the elderly, and the disabled. Thes
programs were the center-piece of the Johnson
administrations 's social welfare reforms. Federal budget
outlays for health services alone tripled from 1965 to
1970: the major portion of the monies went to Medicare and,
to a lesser extent, to Medicaid. The programs helped to
dramatically reduce infant mortality and to increase the
life expectancy of the elderly; they also narrowed the
disparity between the poor and the middle classes and
between blacks and whites with respect to health care
access and health status generally. According to James
Patterson, the safety net created by these programs helped
cause a 50% drop in poverty rates between 1959 and 1974. [5]
Medicare and Medicaid enabled Springfield Hospital to
increase its patient admissions but more importantly to
sharply reduce its charity work (in 1966 alone, free work
declined 15%). By 1967, as the result of government
largess and Springfield's expanded operations, Springfeld's
Finance Committee declared that the hospital's finances
were stable and predictable; financial reports, which for
years had been an occasion of much hand-wringing, now
happily detailed Springfield's rosy curcumstances
. So
confident were the administrators about the hospital's
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fiscal health that financial meetings were convened monthly
instead of weekly, and employees were given a.ple increases
in pensions, salaries, and other benefits. [6]
By 1968, Springfield's achievements in teaching,
research, and comprehensive patient care had made it the
dominant health care institution in Western Massachusetts;
Trustees changed its name to Springfield Hospital Medical
Center (and then to the Medical Center of Western
Massachusetts) to register the fact. [7]
Springfield's development into a medical center
proved controversial among the medical staff. Many
Springfield physicians realized that primary care slipped
to secondary importance in comparison to specialty care,
that the lion's share of monies, of administrative posts,
and of expansion projects were devoted to specialty
services, and that specialty care was increasingly the
focal point of Springfield's education program. Primary
care physicians bristled at administrative actions that
favored specialists in admitting privileges, in
appointments, and in determining Springfield's general
development. [8]
In the sixties and early seventies, in debates about
staffing, about community services, about hospital
programs, and other matters, advocates of primary care
criticized Springfield's priorities. Primary care
physicians argued that Springfield should devote more
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resources to chronic rather than just acute care; they
questioned the need and cost of special services like
kidney transplant centers and elaborate cardiac surgery
programs given the growing body of elderly chronic patients
in the Springfield area. Hospital officials responded that
chronic patients were not their appropriate purview and
could simply be cared for in nursing homes, that they
didn't need hospital care and most importantly were taking
beds needed by acute patients who not incidentally usually
had higher reimbursement rates. Hospital officials also
believed that the surge in the numbers of chronic patients
was a very temporary phenomenon and so were generally
uninterested in building facilities for chronic
patients. [9]
Various state agencies also pressured Springfield to
modify its emphasis on acute care, persuading Springfield
to open clinics and other facilities to combat alcoholism
and drug addiction, and to offer health centers for the
unemployed. Unfortunately, state agencies' interest in
such projects was usually fleeting and episodic, and often
not backed up by funds to help defray the costs of the
clinics. [ 10]
Sometimes, grassroots efforts impelled Springfield to
take action. In 1968, a coalition of community activists,
University of Massachusetts Nursing and Public Health
students, and some sympathetic Springfield physicians
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rc was
established a clinic at a local housing project, while
Springfield officials publicly supported the clinic, most
hospital leaders viewed it as a distraction from thei
-real' mission of acute care, arguing that the clini
trying to address social problems that were not
Springfield's responsibility. Consequently, Springfield
allotted just token monies for the clinic; without adequate
funding, it soon ceased to provide adequate medical care
and became a screening facility
.
[ ii]
in the early sixties, spurred by federal agencies and
supported by the Citizens Action Committee, (a group of
businessmen and professionals—the self-styled "real
leaders" of Springfield who gathered regularly for lunches
at a local insurance company to discuss worthy projects)
, a
study was made of Springfield's health needs. Committee
members visited all the health care facilities in
Springfield; they met with the principal administrators and
leading physicians, and gathered information about
Springfield's health care problems. They discovered a
serious "disjuncture between hospitals and the community"
and "a serious lack of planning betwen the two," asserting
that area hospitals neglected consideration of community
needs in their planning and expansion ventures. Committee
members urged that local hospitals undertake voluntary
cooperative planning—conscious that compulsory measures
would have been rejected by the parties involved as
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unreasonable interference in hospital affairs. After all,
the last thing anyone wanted was hospitals "run comparable
to utilities and so subject to red tape." when the study
was concluded, its chair explained that the committee's
findings were not "to be smiled at and put on a shelf....
The idea is to get citizens to see the need and take
action. "[12]
One result of the Committee's work was the formation,
in 1966, of the Connecticut Valley Health Planning Council
(CVHPC) whose mission was to target unmet health care
needs, to devise programs to meet them, and to help reduce
duplication of services and to promote maximum economies.
CVHPC was one of scores of such councils estblished
nationally during the sixties as a voluntary venture
between local hospitals and physicians and state and
federal authorities. Springfield leaders initially
welcomed the creation of the CVHPC. They thought it would
help to forestall more intrusive government involvement;
they assumed that Springfield would be the key player in
the Council thus enshrining its own leadership, leading to
greater public support for its projects, and resulting in
additional funds for its programs
.[ 13
]
In its early years, the Council had a budget of less
than twenty-thousand dollars, its operating funds donated
by local hospitals, and a small staff of hospital
administrators assigned on a rotating basis. Despite
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Springfield's intentions, it failed to dominate the
council; instead, Springfield settled for a tacit
understanding with the other participating hospitals that
the Council would impose few restraints on any hospital's
expansion plans. Discussions focused far more on holding
the line on nurses' salaries or joint purchase of supplies
than on area hospitals' various building projects or on
addressing community health care problems. [ 14
]
Springfield officials proclaimed in their annual
reports that all had access to its services and would be
properly attended to. But, in fact, non-acute care
occupied a marginal place in Springfield medical care.
Senior physicians and residents avoided service in clinics
and out-patient departments, in the emergency ward, and in
preventive and primary care medicine generally. An
evaluation committee in 1966 reported that patient care was
variable at best and poor in the emergency ward and
outpatient departments. Both emergency services and
outpatient clinics were growing rapidly and served an
important community need. Indeed, a survey determined that
that one-half of recent clinic patients had had no previous
medical contact of any kind. Despite these facts, few
physicians or administrators took the departments seriously
and at decade's end, ambulatory services still lacked
departmental status and continued as an adjunct to other
departments. Efforts to persuade major departments to
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Shoulder more responsibility for these services met with
resounding failure through the decade. [15]
For concerned physicians, the emergency ward was a
particular blight on the hospital. According to one
concerned physician, instead of being operated by
physicians "intimately familiar with and concerned for and
understanding of the medical, social, and economic problems
involved," the emergency ward was a place older physicians
spent "their golden years quietly, with hours and times
they deem necessary, with no standard operating procedures,
or operating manual or fee standard or new innovations, or
effort to add other physicians." No matter; administrators
and senior medical staff were not overly concerned. [16]
Some medical staff members tried to buck the
prevailing priorities of medical practice then current at
Springfield. In 1969, for example, a leader in the
pediatric department while stating his choice for the new
director of the department called for upgrading and giving
priority to ambulatory services "As we are a community
hospital, we require an individual who is interested in
diverse aspects of pediatric care—and not a
superspecialist.
"
[ 17]
While primary care advocates had occasional victories,
most were relegated to second class status at Springfield.
There was, for example, little room for general
practitioners— literally. They were generally excluded
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from hospital privileges in the early sixties. Later, they
were allowed to have "some role" but this was left
undefined and they had no discernible influence on policy
making. m 1971, some residents tried to enhance the role
of primary care by calling for a family residency program.
Their request was rebuffed; senior staff explained that
Springfield lacked enough general practitioners on staff
(no surprise since they had been made unwelcome for the
previous decade) and did not have "sufficient facilities"
for the practice of community medicine. In 1974, another
call was made for a family practice department. The
Physician-In-Chief brushed aside this request as well,
stating that Springfield had many other more important
priorities. [18]
The Joint Conference Committee and numerous advisory
boards tried without success to bridge the differences
between medical center supporters and those who wanted
Springfield to remain a community hospital. Unable to
agree on Springfield's priorities or purposes or long-term
plans, Committee members stuck to bromides about the
importance of education, of better medical care, of the
value of new services, and so on. Such palaver deepened
physicians' sense of frustration about Springfield's
current state. [19]
By 1972 the Joint Conference Committee was practically
moribund, its members still unable—after years of
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meetings—to agree on Springfield's basic goals or
philosophy, and admitting that, given the divisions among
Committee members, it was "difficult to draw firm
conclusions on the future of the Springfield Hospital
Medical Center. "[20]
Many Springfield personnel believed that growth could
solve many of the problems facing the hospital, that with
sufficient monies there would be room for all services and
programs. The problem as in years past was that the state
and federal government grew less and less able or willing
to subsidize Springfield's endless expansion; it
consistently underpaid Springfield's total costs and paid
late at that. Springfield went to court to recoup
government debts dating back in some instances nearly ten
years. By the end of the sixties, Springfield was "losing"
one-half million dollars a year on medicare rates alone and
thousands more on welfare reimbursements which led them to
sharply raise rates for their other patients adversely
affecting public support for hospital projects. Hospital
officials realized they could not long continue in such
circumstances. Due to the cash shortage, administrators
postponed buying equipment, scaled back various projects,
floated bonds to raise monies for some programs, and
finally met with the governor to plead Springfield's case
for more funds. [21]
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Physicians and administrators alike had assumed that
operating revenues would take care of all expansion needs.
However, by the end of the decade, with severe revenue
shortfalls, this was no longer possible; as was the case in
the late fifties, each department turned against the rest,
all clamoring for their rightful share. Surgeons described
their demands as "musts... we are already too far behind."
Pathologists said that their facilities were taxed to the
limit; others spoke of shortages as nearing the danger
point and of staff turnover as vaulting to fifty percent a
year. Each department trooped forth to board meetings
—
hat-in-hand—to explain their duties and acomplishments
,
and to press for their needs. [22]
Competition was particularly ferocious over bed
allocation. The Medical Department Chair in 1969 described
the existing arrangement as "disgraceful," charging that
patients were being admitted to the emergency ward who
should not have been "on the whim of the doctor or social
status of the patient and not on the diagnosis or severity
of illness and needs of the institution," while other
patients were discharged who were not fit to leave. [23]
By the end of the sixties, Springfield was once again
coming apart. Conditions were again unsafe or
unacceptable, the staff again poorly trained, overworked,
and unable to provide timely or basic care to patients, and
equipment again constantly breaking down. In surveys,
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patients expressed ais.ay at Springfieia-s dis.al state and
dissatisfaction with their medical care. [24]
Springfield's difficulties in the early seventies were
compounded by actions of the local Planning Council. The
building spree of Springfield and other hospitals had
caused increasing consternation of local businessmen and
politicians and even of some physicians, all of whom
clamored for cost-cutting. Their views dovetailed with
public opinion in Springfield and nationally and also
reflected an important shift in government health care
policy.
For all their achievements, Medicare and Medicaid had
also created havoc within the health care system, with no
effort to monitor hospital or physician charges, the
programs issued, in effect, a blank check to providers and
consumers alike igniting steep hikes in health care costs;
with provisions for paym.ent for construction and new
services as part of their charges, the programs accelerated
the purchase of high cost and low utilization equipment;
with inadequate coverage and lower payments for primary,
preventative, and chronic care, the programs helped
strenthen a Medical Center model of health care at the
expense of meeting basic community services. [25]
The continuing problems of access, quality, and costs
created disillusionment about the efficacy of government
efforts to improve health care and led many to wonder if
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the country could afford the expense of providing health
care to its citizens. While the U.S. health care system
seemed to careen out of control, other western industrial
countries had controlled costs and provided more health
care coverage through tighter government oversight of the
system. The U.S., in the early seventies, began to do
likewise. [26]
The federal and state governments which had earlier
stressed minimal interference in the workings of the health
care system proceeded to severely clamp down on health care
providers and consumers. It raised eligibility
requirements, reduced coverage, and increased deductibles
for Medicare and Medicaid (in the process formally
abandoning the goal, oft stated since the mid-sixties, of
offering all Americans comprehensive health care) . It cut
reimbursements for both doctors and hospitals; it
instituted tighter surveillance of doctors' services, of
patient admissions, of patients' length of stay, and of
their treatment. State agencies were given the power to
approve (or reject) hospital expansion projects or major
purchases. Federal agencies were given the power to deny
Medicare or Medicaid funding to hospital plans that failed
to win state approval. [27]
Before the early seventies, the Planning Council, like
its 2 00 plus counterparts across the country, had let each
hospital go its own way regarding planning. It had served
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simply as an advisory body without any clear plan how to
structure the area's health care system, and had no means
to implement its very limited proposals or to enforce its
occasional recommendations. However, thanks to increased
federal funding the Council ceased to be the creature of
the local hospital establishment. Moreover, federal
legislation mandating representation of consumer interests
on Council Boards resulted in a more interventionist
Council. The Council tried to improve area health care
delivery by insisting on increased primary care services.
And having gained the power to deny hospitals government
reimbursement it finally had the clout neccessary to begin
to reshape the health care system.
The Council restricted or rejected what it viewed as
unnecessary, inappropriate, or prohibitively expensive
hospital projects. In 1971, for the first time ever, the
Council insisted that Springfield reduce the scope and cost
of its current expansion program. Even more distressing to
hospital officials. Council investigators demanded to know,
also for the first time, just how Springfield's plans fit
in with those of the city's other major hospital—Wesson
Memorial. [28]
Compared to Springfield, Wesson had always had a more
"low tech" primary care approach. Established as a
homeopathic institution in 1906 nearly 20 years after
Springfield's founding, Wesson Memorial never had had the
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financial resources or inclination to match Springfield's
facilities. wesson's bread and butter was routine medical
and surgical care: broken bones, hysterectomies, gall
bladder surgery, and the like. The hospital had fewer
specialists, fewer beds, and a smaller staff than
Springfield and virtually no educational program in the
sixties and seventies. For all these reasons, Wesson's
operating budget was much smaller than Springfield's and
its income more closely matched its expenses. Community
fund drives were usually sufficient to make up deficits and
Wesson's expansion was usually for the purpose of
establishing more bed space rather than to purchase
expensive equipment.
Wesson's doctors had their own brand of
professionalism that emphasized patient contact over
research, and eschewed the sort of fragmented medical care
so prevalent at Springfield and other hospitals throughout
the country. Wesson largely ceded the field to Springfield
for the most advanced acute care; and where special
services were concerned Wesson concentrated on ambulatory
care such as the emergency ward, and the orthopedics and
rehabilitation departments. [29]
In some respects. Wesson was more successful than
Springfield. With a far more homogenous staff than
Springfield, Wesson's physicians had fewer conflicts with
one another. Moreover, the staff's values more closely
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paralelled Wesson's day to day operations and so there was
fewer conflict between physicians and administrators. Most
importantly, Wesson better met the basic health needs of
Springfield's residents and as a result enjoyed a better
public image, and more community support for its expansion
plans
.
While Springfield was mired in severe problems.
Wesson's popularity was such through this period that it
became a direct threat to Springfield for patient dollars
and public support. However, Wesson's decision to
aggressively poach on what had been Springfield's turf was
also due to financial pressures. In general. Wesson had
enjoyed greater financial stability than Springfield
through much of the sixties. However, it too relied more
and more on Medicaid and Medicare as a principal source of
income; it too suffered from what it felt was measly
compensation and tardy payments from government agencies
for indigent and elderly patients. Revenue shortfalls
finally caused Wesson to modify its emphasis on primary
care in favor of specialty services which offered the
promise of higher reimbursables from both government
programs and private insurance plans. [30]
Wesson and Springfield furiously competed with one
another for state and private backing for their respective
programs. Wesson, for example, much to Springfield's
alarm, nominated itself as the region's heart, cancer, and
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stroke center under the auspices of the federal government.
Springfield derided Wesson's proposal, asserting that
Wesson's staff was not up to the job, and argued that
Wesson's real aim was to help boost her building program
and get increased funding and public support. There was
likely much truth to Springfield's claim but the same could
well have been said of Springfield itself during this
period. The Council counseled that the two institutions
plan and apply together for the program. Springfield
officials were queasy though about working with Wesson,
worried that cooperation might give the upstart more credit
than they deserved and raise Wesson's image even higher in
the public eye at Springfield's expense. However,
Springfield leaders feared that if they did not join with
Wesson, Wesson might accrue all the credit to itself. The
result seems to have been luke warm participation in
Springfield's cooperation regarding a Regional Medical
Program. For both hospitals, cooperation was a matter of
convenience not of conviction and had no apparent impact at
the time on either hospital's building or expansion plans.
In 1970, the state Department Of Public Health named
Wesson as Western Massachusett's radiotheraphy center.
Outraged Springfield officials sputtered that Wesson had no
expertise in the field but could do nothing to reverse the
decision. When Wesson later decided to order a new piece
of expensive equipment, a cobalt 60 unit, Springfield
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officials sharply criticized Wesson for fixating on one
particular tool in the arsenal of anti-cancer agents.
Still, Springfield doctors did refer patients to Wesson for
use of that equipment and Springfield obtained one
themselves just as soon as they could. Whatever its
economy or praticality, keeping up with the jones was
essential
.
Physicians of each institution were in the vanguard of
the inter-hospital contest to the chagrin of neutral
observers like Dr. John Ayres, Director of the city's
small chronic care hospital, and a leader of the district
medical society. "Each hospital medical staff," he said,
"zealously guards, support, and seeks to enlarge its own
privileges, prerogatives, and status... for its mother
institution. Can sectarianism which is prevalent
throughout entire hospital programs be overcome? .... Can the
staff of separate hospitals be drawn together for the
common good?" He thought not, and warned Springfield's and
Wesson's partisans "medical planning will continue to be
done by non-medical groups and rightly so long as we remain
divided and fractionated.
" [31]
Writing in the district medical society bulletin,
physicians urged that the two institutions unite to fight
against cancer and endorsed regional hospital planning to
this end. They encouraged Wesson and Springfield to form
an oncology group for joint purchases to "reveal to
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accusers and friends that doctors are interested in
patients and community welfare." Neither hospital seriously
considered their proposal, m 1971, Springfield officials
were hopeful the Council would approve their contruction
projects over Wesson's, convinced that Wesson was
duplicating their own programs and were in any event
inferior. They were stunned when word came from the
Planning Council that Springfield's proposed additions were
deemed too expensive, unnecessary, and economically
wasteful. The Council ordered Springfield to resubmit its
plans and to redesign the project, causing Springfield to
drastically scale down its expansion plans. Springfield no
longer could freely expand its facilities hamstrung by the
planning council, and Wesson's opposition. [32]
In 1973, the Planning Council continued pushing the
two hospitals to work together, and tried to get them to
merge their cancer programs without much success. In 1974
the two did begin to create a tumor registry, and
collaborated on some educational ventures, but that was the
extent of their coooperation. There was no accommodation
between the two where construction, equipment, and
personnel were concerned. [33]
In 1974, both hospitals wanted expensive new cancer
treatment equipment. The Council declared that for either
to do so, they would have to increase cooperation in cancer
management. The two hospitals duly fashioned a new
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committee composed of Jimmy Fund executives, trustees,
physicians, administrators, officials of Monarch Life
insurance Company and others. But cooperation along the
lines of joint services and planning never materialized.
Each hospital was determined to go its own way and not be
bound by any outside committee. Springfield, for its part,
launched a public relations campaign highlighting its
medical center stature and arguing that it, and it alone,
should rightfully acquire the equipment
.[ 34
]
Neither Springfield's nor Wesson's medical staff could
rectify the multiple problems facing the two hospitals, in
1974, an editorial writer in the district medical society
journal reported that the Planning Council had discovered a
pattern of excess, a duplication of efforts, and a
deficiency in both hospitals' personnel and functioning.
He argued that these might be addressed if physicians were
more involved and cooperative. Unfortunately, he
explained, local physicians were too divided within their
own medical staffs not to mention with their rivals
across town—to tackle the problems facing the two
institutions. [35]
The conflict between Wesson and Springfield culminated
in early 1975 when both filed proposals with the Planning
Council to purchase cobalt 60 machines at a cost of one
million dollars each, and presented competing construction
plans totalling close to forty million dollars.
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Springfield leaders feared that, "the public will not stand
for two competing proposals, each appearing to be
identical." And indeed that was the Council^s reaction.
Springfield's plans were blocked by Wesson's own bid. [36]
Springfield's problems were compounded by extreme
financial problems. For more than three years, its general
surplus had been swallowed up by shortfalls. The major
culprit was Medicaid and Medicare whose debts jumped from
two million in 1973 to close to ten million in 1975. [37]
The winter of 1975 was comparable to the financial
emergency of fifteen years earlier; trustees again
anxiously pored over the figures on accounts receivable.
By spring, debts were increasing at a rate of two hundred
thousand dollars a month, and three million six hundred
thousand dollars had been borrowed to keep Springfield
functioning. Furthermore, Springfield officials worried
that the four million five hundred thousand dollars owed by
Medicare might never be paid, and they were also informed
that the state had ordered a freeze on increases for
hospital rates. [38]
Springfield officials fired off a letter to state
legislators, explaining that the institution could not
operate without financial stability, that freezing one
sector of the health care field was simplistic and
counterproductive. They warned that to do so would cause
133
Springfield to delay or cancel the repair and replacement
of needed equipment, and cancel crucial projects.
Hospital officials urged the state to shoulder its rightful
share of the burden of health care costs by paying its back
debts and henceforth providing reasonable renumeration for
hospital services, state officials ignored Springfield's
appeals. [39]
By the spring of 1975, Springfield was close to
running out of funds. The freeze on charges made it
impossible to raise operating revenue; deficits continued
to mount and worsened that summer, triggering severe cuts
in hospital services. In July, Springfield and Wesson
trustees conferred in hopes of reducing the antagonism
between the two institutions. A few weeks later, following
secret trustee negotiations, Springfield's Executive
Director Harry Gifford was informed during a round of golf
that Wesson and Springfield would soon merge.
The decision to merge the institutions was a bold
step. It was an attempt by local business and political
leaders to impose greater order and planning on the area's
health care system. They hoped that the merger would
result in greater economies, in improved services, in
better patient care, in easier access to government monies,
and in the reduction of unnecessary construction. [40]
The merger creating the Baystate Medical Center stirred
considerable opposition from physicians from the former
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Medical center of Western Massachusetts and from Wesson
Memorial Hospital. Partly, this stemmed from the outrage of
medical staff towards trustees who had unilaterally decided
something of great consequence to local physicians. The
trustee's actions reenforced physicians' general belief that
they were no longer in control of their destiny, that their
views no longer determined hospital affairs. Moreover,
physicians were dismayed and outraged that the trustees
could in almost cavalier fashion join together two hospitals
with vastly different resources, operations, medical
cultures, priorities, facilities, and bylaws and that had
competed with one another in a variety of services and
programs
.
Meshing the two institutions was a formidable and
lengthy task. Many Wesson staff felt that their smaller
community hospital was being cannibalized by the larger
richer neighbor, and that the lion's share of the new
hospital's budget would go to provide the most sophisticated
technology at the expense of community needs. For their
part, many from the former Medical Center of Western
Massachusetts felt that their hospital would deteriorate in
quality by incorporating Wesson Memorial whose medical staff
and facilties they found inferior.
A series of task forces were created which then met
regularly from 1976 to 1979 yet were unable to agree on a
clear set of policies. An outside consultant was then
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called in to try to recommend solutions to the many problems
bedeviling the institution-many of which had earlier
divided Springfield twenty years before when a consultant
had been previously hired. The existing conflicts between a
community hospital orientation and a medical center
approach, between private practitioners and salaried
personnel, between specialists and primary care physicians,
and between specialists were now joined by the clash
between two different medical staffs.
The combined medical staff fought among themselves for
control of Baystate's resources. The medical staff fought
over whether there should remain two separate hospital
facilities and whether specific services should be
integrated at one or the other institution. The
administration and trustees having no overall plan only
added to the frustration and low morale of physicians.
In the late 7 0s, continuing government reductions in
payments for Medicare and Medicaid patients compounded
Baystate's problems. This caused a surge of debt that
increased by sixty percent in a few years and led to a
growing deficit for five years, in response, Baystate
increased its rates yearly from thirteen to more than twenty
two percent, about double the national yearly rate of
inflation, which was passed onto private insurers and their
customers in the form of higher premiums. Such financal
136
problems forced Baystate to raid its endowment and
depreciation funds for operating revenue.
In 1980, Baystate was not demonstrably better off than
five years earlier, m fact, the hospital was suffering
physician defections to other local hospitals, and was
plagued by deficiencies in patient care, its medical
programs frozen because of problems of finance and
administration.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Twentieth century private hospitals are usually
depicted as gleaming palaces of medical science that
emphasized specialty care and technical services to the
middle classes who mostly populated them. Charity patients
were but a small factor in their operations; Government
monies, aside from occasional subsidies—notably provided
by the Hill-Burton Congressional Act in the 1940s and
Medicare in the 1960s—were not much of a factor in private
hospitals' development. Such hospitals generally operated
on a stable financial footing which enabled them to enjoy
steady and mostly painless expansion of their physical
plant and programs and personnel. The staffs of up-to-date
physicians—consumate professionals—together formed a
tightly knit medical community. The staff's behavior and
beliefs closely paralelled that of their representative
national professional bodies
—
particularly the AMA.
Hospital physicians had a generally amicable partnership
with administrators. And administrators and physicians
alike enjoyed tight ties to the surrounding community in
the form of ample contributions and widespread volunteer
aid.
Springfield's history provides a startling counter
example to the usual story of private hospitals.
Springfield was a surprisingly grubby, chaotic, and
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contentious institution throughout its history. Physicians
especially were torn by personnel rivalries, town-gown
conflicts, ethnic hostility, antagonisms between
specialists and generalists, and they fought nearly
continuously with administrators, trustees, and outsiders.
Professionalism of physicians as demonstrated by
community service—namely through attending to
Springfield's poorer patients—was sorely lacking
throughout Springfield's history. Professionalism as shown
by physician self-regulation to ensure high quality medical
practice also came remarkably late to Springfield. In
general, professionalism meant one thing above all
—
autonomy—and autonomy enabled many physicians to evade
their responsibilities to provide the best care to patients
and to generally improve the hospital.
There was an enormous gap between the standards of
modern medicine and the actual norms and practice of many
local physicians. The vaunted AMA and other kindred groups
generally did not have much impact in the day to day
affairs of Springfield for most of its history. Moreover,
numerous edicts from professional groups were widely
ignored until the late 1950s. When Springfield's
physicians finally did consent to broader standards, and
relinquished some measure of autonomy, they did so not from
some internalized sense of professional propriety but
because their continued affiliation with Springfield
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Hospital was at stake. Their hospital privileges were
jeopardized by the forceful actions of outside regulators
like government bodies, accrediting organizations, and
national professional groups.
Caring for charity patients was central and not
tangential to Springfield's history. The numbers of those
seeking treatment without the means to pay was a major
factor causing crowding and deterioration of Springfield's
services. The surge of charity patients necessitated
Springfield's expansion while the deficits caused by
uncompensated care made it difficult to do so, all made
long term planning nearly impossible. Government aid for
the poor was both bane and boon to Springfield—boon
because it provided something in the way of payment for the
poor but also bane because more often than not, such
payments failed to cover the actual costs of care,
contributing to chronic fiscal instabilities.
Springfield faced perennial problems because of its
unsteady mix of public and private revenues. A large
portion of its patient base could not afford medical care.
The number of patients varied depending on the state of the
local economy, the availability of reasonably priced
insurance, the demographics of the area, the range of
diseases prevalent and the expense of Springfield's
services. All told, at any given time, perhaps thirty
percent of patients were not paying their full cost of
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care. The dilemma facing Springfield Hospital throughout
its history was how to balance the hospital's bottom line
considerations with the needs of charity patients. Many
charity patients either did not get care or got it
belatedly, or had to employ cajolery or subterfuge to get
treated. When they received care, it tended to be of a
lower quality than that received by private patients.
Pressure from charity patients and their advocates
prevented their being turned away altogether. However, the
medical treatment they received was of lower quality than
that obtained by paying patients. While charity care did
improve as it did for all patients, and charity care
gradually more closely approximated that received by the
well to do, provision for proper health care for charity
patients was granted only grudgingly throughout this
period
.
Some non-medical personnel like social workers,
volunteers, representatives of charitable groups, along
with long-time outsiders like junior medical staff,
outpatient staff, and Jewish physicians, did have a broader
view of appropriate medical care and the responsibilites of
physicians to the larger community. However, their
proposals were blocked for years and sometimes even
decades. Reformers at Springfield were stymied until they
gained the support of outside professional and governmental
agencies, until the broader medical culture favored their
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views, or until there was widespread feeling in the
community that the hospital was in a crisis that demanded
immediate action.
Charity care taxed and destabilized Springfield
Hospital in a variety of ways. Private patients paid more
for their charges or insurance premiums to cover some
portion of the costs of charity patients. When monies were
available for expansion, hospital priorities—namely the
search for maximium revenues—dictated that Springfield
concentrate on specialized in-patient services for private
patients. Emphasizing these services helped spur
Springfield's development into a major medical center and
also led administrators and physicians to neglect important
health care problems facing Springfield's citizens
—
especially those having to do with primary and chronic
care.
Springfield's transformation into a medical center was
its most ambitious effort to grow itself out of its
problems—financial difficulties above all. The problem it
faced in the 70s was that government, employers, and
insurers were increasingly resistant to paying for the
higher costs associated with open ended growth.
Springfield Hospital strained for nearly a century to
deliver high quality care to all at an affordable cost.
The difficulties Springfield and other private hospitals
experienced in trying to do so were the natural result of a
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seriously flawed health care system, characterized by the
autonomy of doctors, a fee for service payment system,
thousands of individual institutions competing for their
share of the health care market, the existance of a large
number of persons unable to pay for their own care, efforts
at cost shifting between hospitals and government agencies,
from employers to insurers to patients, and the absence of
significant social planning of hospital priorities.
(Baystate Medical Center HMO studv Committee Final
Report November 20, 1980).
"The question of HMOs... in many ways represents the
core of many of our current healthcare questions.
Cost is a major factor in today's healthcare world,
and HMOs represent a significant possibility ... for
containment. Competition is a key word in today's
healthcare world and HMOs represent competition
—
not only to each other and to traditional insurance
plans but to the very heart of the life flow of most
hospitals—their inpatient days. The questions of
regulatory control and depth of government involvement
in the health care arena in many ways focus on HMOs...
with some saying that HMOs represent the last
opportunities for the health care field to develop
programs outside direct government control."
Medical historians have seriously misread the history
of hospitals in the twentieth century. Partly as a result,
they have been caught flatfooted when it comes to
discussing contemporary developments. Who among them
writing in the 1980s anticipated the explosive rise of
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)? Wedded to the
notion that the US health care system was a johnny-come-
lately to a "normal" health care system, ie. one with
overarching government involvement—they either foresaw
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growing government regulation or else expected that
hospitals and physicians would join forces and embark on
all sorts of novel proft-making ventures-from chains of
emergicenters to dialysis facilities, but that otherwise
the system would pretty much straggle along as it had.
With a reflexive skepticism about the ability of the market
to meet America's health care needs, none of them
anticipated the enormous growth of hybrid health care
organizations combining financing and the delivery of
health services. Because they overestimated the strength
of doctors and hospitals through the century, they assumed
that these providers would torpedo efforts at meaningful
reform. Medical historians writing in the 1980s recognized
that the era of government and private insurers funding
massive expansion of hospitals—funding which had also
sustained providers' power—had passed. Yet, none of them
anticipated that large employers and insurers and
government would, by creating and supporting HMOs, utterly
usurp providers' dominance in healthcare. HMOs have begun
to dethrone the medical center model emphasizing acute
inpatient care in favor of primary and preventative
services. Furthermore, by installing primary care
physicians as a major gatekeeper for patient services, HMOs
have begun to restore primary care physicians to the center
of medical practice.
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It could well be argued that HMO's are a much needed
improvement on the existing system bringing some measure of
rationality and order to healthcare. Certainly,
Springfield's experience suggests that individual hospitals
or even hospitals as a group would not change much without
being forced to as the result of powerful outside
organizations like HMOs. And while available records for
the period since 1980 are scanty and sketchy, they do
indicate that Baystate Medical Center made an early and
significant accommodation to HMOs. Baystate wisely chose
to market itself to HMOs and reshaped its services to some
extent to gain HMO support and customers. By doing so,
Baystate expanded and diversified its facilities which made
it more financially solvent, partly by reducing inpatient
costs and partly by securing a steady stream of private
patients to offset the large numbers of charity patients.
Though Baystate 's experience suggests that HMOs might
be good for individual hospitals, it remains to be seen
whether the current system of managed care under HMOs can
adequately reconstruct the nation's healthcare system. As
Theodore Marmor in Understanding Health Care Reform, Philip
Lee in The Nation's Health, Eli Ginzberg in Critical Tssnpg
In U.S. Health RgfgrJD and others point out, HMOs success is
predicated on physician's compliance with cost control
incentives. It is not at all clear whether physicians
might evade these, or assuming that physicians comply.
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Whether doing so win lead to not just a reduction in costs
but in the quality of care, or whether the cost of
micromanagement will undermine savings to the system as a
Whole.
The sort of rule making characteristic of HMOs is
unheard of in those countries where global budgets for
operating and capital expenditures determine allocations of
hospital programs, and services are determined at the
provincial or federal level, what's more, quality in such
regimes seems to be on par with our own. But in lieu of
such a system being established here, perhaps this sort of
rule making is a necessary step especially given American
physicians well deserved reputation for technological
imperatives. Lastly, and most importantly, even if costs
are reduced, there is no guarantee that the savings will be
used to ensure expanded access to care for the millions
presently without it or to ensure that that their care is
adequate
.
Just as the specialized medical center model seemed
invincible and permanent, yet lasted just a brief span of
time, so it is unlikely that HMOs in their current
incarnation will be the last reform of the healthcare
system. It may be that the public's opposition to
increased taxes or another big government program might be
reduced if citizens lose heart in HMOs. It may be that
physicians who have always seen big government as their
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biggest bugaboo will turn against HMOs for reducing their
salaries, depriving them of decision-making powers, adding
to their paperwork, and making them employees of large
corporations. Clearly, the reshaping of the healthcare
system will preoccupy physicians, policy-makers
, and
ordinary citizens for years to come.
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APPENDICES
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A. THE GROWTH OF SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL
X iiAK PATIENTS
ADMITTED
EMPLOYEES PHYSICIANS
1890 163 8 13
1900 487 18 24
1910 2,150 55 37
1920 3,911 99 50
1930 4,583 128 107
1940 6,270 156 122
1950 8, 357 305 146
1960 13 , 000 898 207
1970 13 , 100 2, 000 450
1980 39,700 3,800 1, 000
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DEVELOPMENT OF SPRINGFIELD HOSPITALS
YEAR NAME TYPE FOPTTQ
1889 Springfield non-denominational
,
private generalinedical cp^t^
1898 Mercy Catholic,
private
general
inedical care
1906 Wesson
Maternity
non-denominational
private
obstetrics
1906 Wesson
Memorial
non-demoninationa
i
private
general
inedical care
1948 Springfield
Municipal
public chronic
illness &
elderly care
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